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Kentucky's Broad Form Deed
Amendment:
Constitutional Considerations
CAROLYN S. BRATT* AND KAREN J. GREENWELL**
Kentucky's 1988 general election saw yet another attempt to
deal with the continuing problem of broad form deeds. Eighty-
three percent of the voters approved the so-called Broad Form
Deed Amendment [hereinafter Amendment) to the Kentucky
Constitution.' The Amendment provides:
In any instrument heretofore or hereafter executed purporting
to sever the surface and mineral estates or to grant a mineral
estate or to grant a right to extract minerals, which fails to
state or describe in express and specific terms the method of
coal extraction to be employed, or where said instrument con-
tains language subordinating the surface estate to the mineral
estate, it shall be held, in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, that the intention of the parties to
the instrument was that the coal be extracted only by the
method or methods of commercial coal extraction commonly
known to be in use in Kentucky in the area affected at the
time the instyument was executed, and that the mine al estate
be dominant to the surface estate for the purposes of coal
extraction by only the method or methods of commercial coal
extraction commonly known to be in use in Kentucky in the
area affected at the time the instrument was executed.
2
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The Broad Form Deed Amendment retroactively imposes a
special rule of interpretation on instruments which create a right
to mine coal. The rule is cast in the form of a rebuttable
presumption that the original parties to these agreements in-
tended to limit the mineral estate owner to the use of those
mining methods which were "commonly known to be in use"
at the time the instrument was executed. Most broad form deeds
were executed in the early 1900s when deep-shaft. mining was
the common method of mineral extraction.' Therefore, the
Amendment limits today's mineral owners who hold under a
broad form deed to the use of deep-shaft mining methods unless
they can overcome the Amendment's presumption by clear and
convincing evidence.
The presumption reverses a long line of judicial decisions in
Kentucky. 4 Kentucky's courts have consistently held that the
mineral owner under a broad form deed had a virtually unres-
tricted power to employ later-developed mining methods to ex-
tract its coal. The presumption is both practically and factually
irrebuttable. Since the original parties to the transaction are long
since dead, no direct evidence is available to rebut the Amend-
ment's presumption. It is factually impossible to overcome the
presumption because the mineral owner cannot prove that the
contemporary mining method the owner wants to employ was
in common use in Kentucky before the method was actually
developed.'
The Amendment is a thinly disguised attempt to readjust
property rights in favor of the surface owner and against the
mineral estate owner by mandating the reinterpretation of con-
tracts made almost one hundred years ago. 6 Such a law raises a
Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the Amendment prohibits
mineral extraction by surface mining, augering, long wall mining, and continuous seam
mining since those techniques were developed well after most broad form deeds were
executed.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 11-54 for a discussion of the history of
Kentucky case law and statutory law concerning the rights of the respective parties to a
broad form deed.
I The Kentucky Supreme Court made the same point in Akers v. Baldwin, 736
S.W.2d 294, 308-9 (Ky. 1987). Modern surface mining, the primary target of the Broad
Form Deed Amendment, was non-existent in the early 1900s when most, if not all,
broad form deeds were executed.
6 Id. at 310.
The legislative preamble to the Amendment articulates seven other purposes for the
Amendment. They are:
[l1t is necessary to facilitate and require the demonstration of a clear
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number of federal constitutional considerations. Does the appli-
cation of the Broad Form Deed Amendment to already existing
contracts of severance constitute a taking of property without
compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments 7 Does the Amendment impermissibly interfere with pri-
vate contacts?8 Does either the Amendment's retroactive effect
or its factually irrebuttable presumption impermissibly infringe
on the due process protections afforded by the fourteenth
amendment? 9 Does the Amendment create classes which contra-
vene the guarantees of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment?'0 This article will explore and evaluate each
of these federal constitutional questions raised by the Kentucky
Broad Form Deed Amendment.
I. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BROAD FORM
DEED
Kentucky law has long recognized that severance can create
distinct legal estates in the surface of the land and in the minerals
understanding between the owners of surface and mineral estates in land
concerning their respective rights to use and occupy or injure the surface
of the land; and
[lit is desirable to protect the security of titles to land and improvements
thereto; and
[T]he free alienability of land must be promoted; and
[Wle must prevent hardship and injustice to surface or mineral owners
arising from uncertainty of the law; and
[W]e should promote the conservation and the full and efficient use of all
natural resources of the state, including the land, the making of improve-
ments to the land, the growth of agriculture, the development of new
industry and the general economic well-being of the state and its people;
and
[W]e should codify a rule of construction for mineral deeds relating to
coal extraction so as to implement the intention of the parties at the time
the instrument was created; and
[lit is desirable to foster certainty and uniformity in the operation of the
law.
1988 Ky. ACTS, ch. 117.
' U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part: "nor shall private property be taken
for pubtic use, without Sst cotxpttotx."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in part: "nor shall any State deprive any person
of ... property, without due process of law."
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 provides that "[n]o State shall . . : pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... "
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in part: "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
. U.S. CONST. amend, XIV provides in part: "nor shall any State . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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under the land.,, However, creating theoretically separate, but
practically intertwined estates in the same piece of land has led
to much litigation and various legislative attempts to define the
rights of the owners of these competing interests. The resolution
of these conflicts has been particularly difficult in Kentucky
because of the widespread use of broad form mineral deeds to
sever the mineral estate from the surface estate.' 2
A broad form mineral deed contains a very long and detailed
description of all the rights granted to the mineral owner.' 3 In
addition to conveying "all" the minerals to the grantee, a broad
form deed usually includes a grant of such surface rights as the
mineral owner deems "necessary or convenient" for the full and
free exercise and enjoyment of the mineral estate. Typically, the
broad form deed also contains an express waiver of liability for
damage caused by the mineral owner's use of the surface in its
mining operation. The interest retained by the surface owner is
expressly limited only to such surface rights as are consistent
with the mineral rights conveyed.'
As early as 1916 in Blue Grass Coal Corp. v. Combs, 5
Kentucky's highest court held that, after severance, the surface
estate is servient to the mineral estate. A few years later, in
McIntire v. Marion Coal Company, 6 the same court interpreted
a mineral deed granting the mineral owner the right to use the
surface of the land as the mineral owner deemed "necessary and
convenient" and reserving the surface rights to the grantor. The
" See Kincaid v. McGowan, 4 S.W. 802 (1887). The doctrine of severance is
recognized in all jurisdictions except Louisiana. 4 D. VISH, COAL LAW AND REGULATION,
§ 80.01[l] (1983). The doctrine of severance was also part of the English common law.
See Note, The Common Law Rights To Subjacent Support and Surface Preservation,
38 Mo. L. REV. 234, 234-35 (1973).
,2 Various types of broad form mineral deeds were used by coal and land com-
panies in Kentucky. The most prevalent broad form deed in the early 1900s was the
Mayo deed named for its creator John C.C. Mayo. For a history of the Mayo and other
broad form mineral deeds see, Pfeiffer, Kentucky's New Broad Form Deed Law - Is It
Constitutional? 1 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 57 (1985-86); Note, Kentucky's Experience With
The Broad Form Deed, 63 Ky. L.J. 107 (1974-75); and Note, Broad-Form Deed-Obstacle
to Peaceful Co-Existence Between Mineral and Surface Owners, 60 KY. L.J. 742 (1971-
72).
For examples of typical broad form deed language see Watson v. Kenlick Coal
Co., 498 F.2d 1183, 1185-86 (6th Cir. 1974); and Case v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 276 S.W.
573, 574 (Ky. 1925).
A kers, 736 S.W.2d at 300.
,1 182 S.W. 207 (Ky. 1916).
,6 227 S.W. 298 (Ky. 1921).
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McIntire court strongly reaffirmed the dominance of the mineral
estate. It held the mineral estate was "dominant, superior, and
exclusive in every circumstance or condition where the owner
thereof shall deem it necessary or convenient to make such use
of the surface as the deed allows."'"
In the McIntire decision the court found that the rights
conveyed to the mineral estate owner were far superior to the
rights retained by the surface estate owner. The mineral owner
had the power to exclude the surface owner so long as the
mineral grantee paid compensation for any surface improve-
ments it destroyed., 8 The court refused to examine the wisdom
of the grantor's action in entering into such a transaction. In-
stead, the court chose to construe the deed strictly according to
its terms and against the grantor.
Kentucky's highest court has also recognized a limitation on
the mineral owner's power to use the surface of the land. In
Case v. Elkhorn Coal Corp.,19 the court held the surface owner
could complain about the mineral owner's use of the surface if
the mineral owner exercised its power "oppressively, arbitrarily,
wantonly or maliciously." Later cases made it clear that this
was not a very significant restriction on the mineral owner's use
of the surface.
For example, in Rudd v. Hayden, the Court of Appeals
stated that a mineral owner's right to use the surface may include
the right to employ mining techniques other than the deep-shaft
method such as "open," "cut," "strip," or "hydraulic" meth-
ods of mining.20 In Wells v. North East Coal Company, the high
court held that the mineral owner could use the surface in any
way it deemed necessary to obtain its minerals.2 Kentucky's
highest court reached the same conclusion in its first surface
coal mining case, Treadway v. Wilson.22 The mineral owner was
permitted to remove its coal by any proposed surface mining
methods as long as it was not exercised "oppressively, arbitrar-
ily, wantonly or maliciously." 23
11 Id. at 300.
I /d.
276 S.W. 573 (Ky. 1925).
20 97 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Ky. 1936).
72 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1934).
22 192 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1946).
23 Id. at 950. The court quoted from Case, supra note 19.
1989-901
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Finally, in the 1956 case of Buchanan v. Watson,24 Kentuck-
y's highest court squarely faced the twin issues of the right of
the mineral owner under a broad form deed to employ modern
surface mining methods to extract the coal and the effectiveness
of the waiver of damage provision in a broad form deed. Both
issues were resolved in favor of the owner of the minerals.
The trial court in Buchanan had found that surface mining
would destroy the surface and was the only feasible and eco-
nomical way to mine the coal. The surface owner argued that
the parties had not contemplated using surface mining techniques
when the deed was executed in 1907. Therefore, according to
the surface owner, the mineral owner's use of such a later-
developed mining method violated the surface owner's rights.
2
1
The Buchanan court held that, although the parties may not
have specifically contemplated surface mining, the mineral deed
nevertheless granted the right to remove all the minerals.
It seems clear that the parties intended the conveyance of the
coal. To deny the right to remove it by the only feasible process
is to defeat the principal purpose of the deed.
We think the [trial court] correctly decided that since the
appellant had the right to remove all of the coal in, on, and
under the surface of this tract, the particular method contem-
plated by the parties (in the absence of language prohibiting
other methods) does not preclude him from utilizing the only
feasible process of extracting the coal.
26
The Buchanan court also sustained the enforceability of the
deed's waiver of damage clause. It found that when a mineral
estate was created by a broad form deed containing a waiver of
damage provision, the mineral owner is only liable for damages
when the surface is destroyed arbitrarily, wantonly, or mali-
ciously.
27
The Buchanan court predicated its decision on the need it
perceived for certainty and uniformity of mineral titles as well
as the hardship uncertainty would cause. 2 The court said:
290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
As is typical of broad form deeds, the deed did not mention the types of mining
methods to be used.
26 Buchanan, 290 S.W.2d at 42-43.
2? Id. at 43.
28 Id. at 44.
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[T]he rule [that no damages are assessed when the surface is
damaged by modern mining methods] has become so firmly
established that it is a rule of property law governing the rights
under many mineral deeds covering much acreage in Eastern
Kentucky. To disturb this rule now would create great confu-
sion and much hardship .... It is especially desirable that the
law of property rights should remain stable after it has been
settled.
29
Later judicial decisions did not disturb the Buchanan court's
determination of these two principles of Kentucky's property
law.30 For example, in Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace,31 the
court extended the Buchanan rationale by permitting the mineral
owner under a broad form deed with a waiver of damage pro-
vision to use auger mining techniques to extract its coal. The
Blue Diamond decision further strengthened the rights of mineral
owners because the court stated that:
The mere exercise of a right to mine in a particular fashion
cannot of itself be classified as arbitrary, wanton, or malicious.
It is the manner of the mining operation, as distinguished from
the fact of its being carried on, that determines the liability
for damages.
32
In Kodak Coal Company v. Smith,33 a mineral owner was per-
mitted to auger mine under its broad form deed, even though
the coal could have been mined by other methods less destructive
to the surface.
3 4
29 Id. at 43-44.
30 For example, in Bevander Coal Co. v. Matney, 320 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1959), the
court reaffirmed that a waiver of damage provision in a mineral deed precluded the
surface owner from obtairling damages unless the mining was oppressive, arbitrary,
wanton or malicious. The decision in Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718 (Ky.
1960), may appear to be an exception to Buchanan's no-damage rule. The surface owner
was permitted to sue for damages when the mineral estate owner extracted oil and gas
by a new technique called "water flooding." However, the Wiser court distinguished
Buchanan because the migeral deed in Wiser did not contain a waiver of damage
provision. In Croley v. Round Mountain Coal Co., 374 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1964), the
court permitted the surface owner to recover damages from the mineral owner who was
auger mining on other land and casting waste material on the land of the surface owner.
The practice was found to be mining conducted in an oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or
malicious manner.
3 337 S.W.2d 725 (I9y. 1960).
32 Id. at 727.
31 338 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1960).
3, Other cases in which the Buchanan decision was adhered to and extended
1989-901
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Kentucky's adherence to the principles of property law artic-
ulated in the Buchanan decision did not occur merely because
of a lack of opportunity to reconsider and reverse that decision.
In 1968, in Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining,15 the Kentucky
Court of Appeals was presented with a coordinated challenge to
the Buchanan decision. The Kentucky Civil Liberties Union, the
Appalachian Group to Save The Land and People, Inc., and the
Sierra Club joined the plaintiff surface owner and argued that
the court should overrule its decision in Buchanan.16 The court,
however, affirmed both the correctness and the continued vitality
of the Buchanan decision. It once again held that under a broad
form deed containing a waiver of damage provision, the mineral
owner has the right to employ later-developed mining methods,
including surface mining, without incurring liability for the dam-
age such mining methods cause to the surface.
The Martin court based its reaffirmation of the Buchanan
decision, in part, on its determination that "the mineral owner
[under a broad form deed] bought and paid for the right to
destroy the surface in a good faith exercise of the right to remove
the minerals . . . ,,17 Therefore, the court found no basis for
obligating the mineral owner to pay damages for exercising that
right. Similarly, the Martin court determined that the parties to
a broad form deed intended the mineral owner's right to use the
surface would be superior to any competing right of the surface
owner.3" As a result, the court said the mineral owner could not
include: Ritchie v. Midland Mining Co., 347 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1961); Wright v. Bethlehem
Minerals Co., 368 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1963); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Campbell, 371
S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1963); and, Croley v. Round Mountain Coal Co., 374 S.W.2d 852
(Ky. 1964). The Kentucky Supreme Court's opinion in Commerce Union Bank v.
Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1976), is not in conflict with the Buchanan decision. The
mineral estate owner was not permitted to surface or open pit mine the minerals because
the mineral deed was not a broad form deed.
429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
Id. at 397.
" Id. at 399. The conclusion that the mineral owner had bought and paid for the
right to destroy the surface was not without foundation. The Martin court found that
in 1900, a time when the use of broad form deeds was proliferating in Eastern Kentucky,
the average value per acre of land in the county in which the contested mineral operation
was located was then only $2.90 per acre. The mineral estate at issue in Martin had
been purchased for $3.00 per acre. Id. at 398.
11 Id. at 397-99. The conclusion that the parties to a broad form deed intended
the mineral owner's right to use the surface to be superior to any competing right of
use in the surface owner also had a basis in fact. The court relied on the fact that in
the county wherein the Martin controversy arose a great percentage of the land was
[VOL. 5:9
1989-90] BROAD FORM DEED
be forced to repurchase the right to use the surface merely
because it chose to employ a later-developed mining method.
The opponents of surface mining were consistently unsuc-
cessful in their attempts to prohibit the use of modern mining
methods, particularly surface mining, through judicial decisions.
However they also pursued legislative solutions.3 9 In 1974, the
Kentucky legislature passed a statute which required a mineral
owner to secure the written consent of the surface owner before
the state could issue a surface mining permit. 4° In Department
for Natural Resources & Environmental Protection v. No. 8 Ltd.
of Virginia,4' the Kentucky Supreme Court held the statute was
an unconstitutional exercise of the state's police power. The
court determined the statute was not an environmental conser-
vation measure because it did not prohibit surface mining or
regulate its attendant problems. The statute merely granted the
surface owner, at its option, the right to veto or permit surface
mining of the land. The court found that the state was really
motivated by an impermissible purpose of changing "the relative
legal rights and economic bargaining positions of many private
parties under their contracts rather than achiev[ing] any public
purpose."
42
hillside land of no productive value. As to the small amounts of bottom land, the court
accepted the argument that to obtain the best price possible for the mineral rights in the
hillside land, the owner sold the rights to the bottom land. The owner could reasonably
be understood to be "willing to take the chance on future destruction of his bottom
land to get the immediate money." Id. at 398. The court said that if the surface owner
had intended otherwise, the bottom land could have been excluded from the deed. Also,
the court justified its finding that the parties intended the possible destruction of the
surface because such a possibility existed even if mining were restricted to deep mining
methods.
Slag and waste could have been piled on the land; tram roads requiring
land fills could have been built and slides could have beer) caused (see
Wells v. North East Coal Co., 255 Ky. 63, 72 S.W.2d 745); springs could
have been filled with dirt and muck, stones and other debris could have
been deposited so as to destroy the land for agricultural purposes (see
United Carbon Co. v. Webb, 282 Ky. 79, 137 S.W.2d 733); tipples and
mine houses could have been built.
Id. at 398.
11 The opponents of surface mining fared no better in federal court than they had
in state court. In Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., 498 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1012 (1975), the court rejected the surface owner's contention that the
Buchanan construction of broad form deeds was an unconstitutional taking of private
property under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350.060(2)(1974)(effective Jan. 1, 1975)(Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1985) [hereinafter KRS].
C 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1975).
41 Id. at 687.
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In 1977 Congress enacted the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act 3 (SMCRA) which established a comprehensive
regulatory scheme for surface mining and reclamation operations
on both federal and private lands within the United States. If a
state desired to assume permanent and exclusive regulatory au-
thority (primacy) over surface mining, the Secretary of the In-
terior had to approve the state's proposed permanent program.
To secure that approval, the state had to enact laws and regu-
lations embodying SMCRA's environmental protection and per-
formance standards. Kentucky achieved primacy for its permanent
program on May 18, 1982."
Not mollified by the enactment of extensive federal and state
programs regulating surface mining, the opponents of surface
mining launched another legislative initiative in 1984 which cul-
minated in the Mineral Deed Act. 45 This was an attempt to
statutorily impose the same presumption on the interpretation
of broad form deeds as is now contained in the Broad Form
Deed Amendment. In fact, the Broad Form Deed Amendment
is a verbatim replica, including the alleged purposes, of the ill-
fated Mineral Deed Act.
In Akers v. Baldwin,46 the Kentucky Supreme Court invali-
dated the Mineral Deed Act to the extent it purported to apply
to instruments in existence at the time the statute was enacted.
As to already existing instruments, the court found the statutory
presumption was an unconstitutional violation of the principle
of separation of powers47 embodied in Sections 27, 28 and 109
of the Kentucky Constitution.4
41 Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1326 (1988)).
- 47 Fed. Reg. 21,404 (1982). For a history of Kentucky's actions to secure
primacy, see Bratt, Surface Mining in Kentucky, 71 Ky. L.J. 7, 7-9 (1982-83).
45 KRS §§ 381.930-.940.
, Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 310.
,7 Id. at 309. The Kentucky Supreme Court, citing Department For Natural
Resources v. No. 8, Ltd. of Virginia, 528 S.W.2d 684 (1975), also held that the statute
was an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of a contract. Akers, 736 S.W.2d
at 310.
K-i. Co~s-r. § 27 provides" "The powers of the government of the Common-
wealth of Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them
be confined to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to
one; those which are eecutive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another."
Ky. CONST. § 28 provides: "No person or collection of persons, being of one of
those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others,
except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted."
Ky. CONST. § 109 provides: "The judicial power of the commonwealth shall be
[VOL. 5:9
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The most important aspect of the Akers decision for analyz-
ing the Broad Form Deed Amendment was the court's decision
to revisit Buchanan v. Watson.49 The Akers court reaffirmed the
Buchanan decision holding that the minerals may be removed
by any method of mining the mineral owner deems appropriate
so long as the mining operation is not conducted oppressively,
arbitrarily, wantonly or maliciously. 0 However, the Akers court
overruled Buchanan's denial of damages to a surface owner
whose land is surface mined." The Akers court held that the
waiver of damage provision in a broad form deed only immu-
nizes the mineral estate owner from surface damage caused by
using the mining methods expressly mentioned in the deed or in
common use when the deed was executed. Otherwise, the mineral
owner must pay damages when it uses a later-developed mining
method which damages the surface.
2
The Akers decision was not, however, the victory long sought
by surface mining opponents. The Kentucky Supreme Court
expressly excluded from its new damage rule all conveyances by
broad form deeds, as well as leases and mining efforts under
broad form deeds, made between the date of the Buchanan
decision (May 4, 1956) and the date of the Akers decision (July
2, 1987).11 The Buchanan no-damages rule continued to apply
to these exempted conveyances, leases, and mining efforts. Also,
the Akers court held that if a conveyance or lease was made
while the Buchanan decision was in effect, any future convey-
ance, lease, or mining effort pertaining to that property was
controlled by Buchanan's no-damages rule. The court decided
to exclude such conveyances, leases, and mining efforts "[blecause
of the possible adverse effect of our decision [to overrule the
damage portion of Buchanan] on mineral rights acquired in
reliance on Buchanan .... ,, 4
vested exclusively in one Court of Justice which shall be divided into a Supreme Court,
a Court of Appeals, a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the Circuit Court and
a trial court of limited jurisdiction known as the District Court. The court shall constitute
a unified judicial system for operation and administration. The impeachment powers of
the general assembly shall remain inviolate."
49 290 S.W.2d at 40.
Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 305.
' Id. at 305-6.
12 The measure of damages was established by the court as the difference in the
market value of the surface estate, including improvements thereon, immediately before
and immediately after the use of the surface by the mineral owner. Id. at 307.
I1 d. at 307.
54 Id.
1989-90]
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Therefore, on the eve of the adoption of the Broad Form
Deed Amendment to the Kentucky Constitution, Kentucky's law
concerning the respective rights of mineral and surface owners
under broad form deeds was clear and unequivocal. All judicial
and legislative attempts to change the hierarchical relationship
between the surface and mineral estates had been unsuccessful.
Whether pre-Buchanan, post-Buchanan or post-Akers, the min-
eral owner had the right to extract its minerals by any mining
method, including surface mining, it chose to employ.
Before the Buchanan decision, it was not crystal clear whether
a waiver of damage provision in a broad form deed immunized
the mineral owner from paying for the surface damage it caused
by surface mining the coal. That precise question had not pre-
viously reached Kentucky's highest court. However, the Buch-
anan court viewed its no-damages rule as the natural extension
Or codification of long recognized principles of Kentucky prop-
erty law. Certainly, after Buchanan there was no basis for any
confusion. The decision clearly and expressly held that if the
surface disturbance occurred because of mining operations con-
ducted under a broad form deed containing a waiver of damage
provision, the surface owner had no grounds upon which it
could recover.
The Akers decision did reverse the damage portion of the
Buchanan decision. However, because the Akers court exempted
from its decision all broad form deeds, leases, and mining efforts
which occurred post-Buchanan and pre-Akers, most mineral es-
tates created by a broad form deed continued to be subject to
the Buchanan no-damages rule.
The Broad Form Deed Amendment does not purport to
address Kentucky's law -on the effect of a waiver of damage
provision in mineral instruments. It does, however, radically
rewrite Kentucky's law on the right of mineral owners under a
broad form deed to employ surface, or other, modern mining
methods. Before the enactment of the Amendment, the right to
employ later-developed mining methods to extract coal was un-
questionable because the state's highest court had consistently
Tecognized such a Tight in the mineral owneT. Due to the enact-
ment of the Broad Form Deed Amendment, mineral owners are
now required to use turn-of-the-century mining methods unless
they can secure the permission of the surface owner to use




The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides in pertinent part: "[Nior shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." 55 That prohibition
applies to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment as well as to the federal government.
5 6
Any governmental action, including the adoption of a state
constitutional amendment, which interferes with private property
rights must be evaluated in light of this express federal consti-
tutional directive. If the governmental action amounts to taking
private property for a public use, the government must compen-
sate the property owner or it must refrain from such action.
The first step in a taking analysis of the Broad Form Deed
Amendment is to determine whether the pre-Amendment right
of a Kentucky mineral owner under a broad form deed to mine
coal by later-developed mining methods is a property right pro-
tected by the fifth amendment. If that question is answered
affirmatively, additional inquiry is needed to determine whether
the Broad Form Deed Amendment was enacted to further a
valid public purpose. If that question is answered negatively, the
Amendment fails. Finally, the fifth amendment does not require
every governmental infringement on private property rights to
be either compensated or avoided. If a mineral owner has a
property interest in its right to employ modern mining methods,
the destruction of that right by the Broad Form Deed Amend-
ment must be analyzed to determine if it is the type of infringe-
ment on property which is constitutionally impermissible.
A. Determining What Constitutes Private Property
Private property interests are protected but not created by
the United States Constitution. Property interests are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understand-
ings that come from an independent source such as state law.
5 7
Moreover, property is not the thing itself, but the rights one has
in the thing. This right of property is not a single indivisible
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
56 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
17 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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concept, but a bundle of legally protected interests" For ex-
ample, one of the legally protected property interests in a lan-
downer's bundle of property rights is the owner's right to use
and enjoy that real property. 9
Kentucky law permits the creation of separate surface and
mineral estates in real property ° One person can have a legally
protected interest in the use and enjoyment of the surface of the
land while another has a legally protected interest in the use and
enjoyment of the minerals beneath the surface. 61 However, the
mineral owner can only use and enjoy its property by mining
the minerals.62 For purposes of the guarantees of the fifth
amendment, the mineral estate owner's right to use and enjoy
its estate by extracting the mineral is property.
6
1
Property owners can also have constitutionally protected
property interests in certain expectations they have concerning
their property. 64 A property owner's mere unilateral expectation
or belief concerning the use it can make of its property is not
protected by the fifth amendment. On the other hand, a reason-
able, investment-backed expectation is property for purposes of
the fifth amendment's guarantees .6  Kentucky mineral owners
holding under broad form deeds executed before the Broad Form
Deed Amendment have such a constitutionally protected prop-
erty interest in their expectation that they can employ modern
mining methods to extract their coal.
If an owner's expectation is not bound up with its decision
to invest in that property, then the owner's right is not protected
by the Constitution. In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
11 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). Examples of
the legally recognized interests included in the "full bundle" of rights a person may
have as a property owner are the right to exclude, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1979); the right to possess, United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372
(1946); the right to transfer inter vivos by sale or gift, Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51
(1979); and, the right to pass property by devise or intestate inheritance, Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704 (1987).
19 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979); see also United States v, Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
Kincaid v. McGowan, 4 S.W. 802 (1997).
1' Id. at 804.
62 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 392 (1922).
63 Id. at 414.
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.




City,66 the owners of the Grand Central Terminal challenged the
constitutionality of New York City's Landmarks Preservation
Law. After the terminal was designated a landmark by the city,
the owners were denied permission to build a multistory office
building over the terminal. The owners claimed they had a
constitutionally cognizable expectation under the fifth amend-
ment because of their belief, acquired before enactment of the
preservation law, that they could develop the air space above
the terminal. The United States Supreme Court rejected that
claim as "untenable."
The Supreme Court found that the terminal owners' belief
did not rest on any expectation created by an act of the state
itself. That belief merely reflected the terminal owners' personal
desires, hopes, or wishes. Moreover, the full use of the air rights
had not played an integral role in the terminal owners' decision
to purchase the terminal. They had merely bought a terminal.
Even after the city denied the owners the right to build an office
building over the terminal, the terminal was still able to function
profitably as a terminal. The government had not deprived the
owners of any "reasonable" or "investment-backed" expecta-
tions when it denied them the right to develop the airspace by
building an office tower.
In contrast, a Kentucky mineral owner's expectation that it
can employ modern mining methods is inextricably bound up
with the decision to purchase and invest in the mineral estate.
After all, minerals have no use unless they can be mined for a
profit. The mineral owner's expectation that it can employ mod-
ern mining methods is reasonable in both the everyday and
constitutional meanings of the word. It is axiomatic that a
mineral owner acquires a mineral estate for the purpose of
mining the minerals. Only in a Luddite67 society would it be
reasonable to presume that the parties to a broad form deed
intended the mining methods used by the mineral estate owner
to remain static. Inherent in the very nature of our capitalist
economy is that the methods of mining will evolve as mineral
owners search for more efficient means by which to mine their
minerals.," The sweeping language used in broad form deeds to
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
-' Luddites was the name given to organized bands of English craftspersons who
rioted in favor of the destruction of textile machinery that was displacing them. VI
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 375-76 (1978).
Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 304-5.
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describe the nature of the mineral owner's rights (and to limit
the rights of the surface owner) also supports the conclusion
that a mineral owner can reasonably expect to employ mining
methods developed after the broad form deed was executed.
A Kentucky mineral owner's investment-backed expectation
that it may employ modern mining methods to extract its coal
is constitutionally reasonable because that expectation is firmly
grounded in Kentucky's law. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States69
and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,70 the United States Supreme Court
found that the challenged governmental action impermissibly
interfered with the property owner's reasonable investment-backed
expectations because the government created those expectations.
The property owners in the Kaiser Aetna case expended
significant amounts of money to connect their private lagoon to
an adjacent navigable bay as part of developing the lagoon into
a marina for their own private use. Despite the fact that public
access to the marina was still physically possible after the dredg-
ing operation was complete, the lagoon owners expected to be
able to exclude the public from the marina due to the actions
of officials in the Army Corps of Engineers. Before dredging
the connection and making other improvements to the lagoon,
the lagoon owners checked with the Corps. Officials in the Corps
informed the property owners that the lagoon was a nonnavig-
able water which was not subject to its jurisdiction. After the
connection was made and the improvements were built, the
Corps claimed that the property owners could not charge an
access fee to the public because the private lagoon had been
converted into a navigable water of the United States.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the
government had to pay just compensation to the lagoon owners
if it wanted to obtain free access for the public to the marina.
The Court said that "[w]hile the consent of individual officials
representing the United States cannot 'estop' the United States
... it can lead to the fruition of a number of expectancies
embodied in the concept of 'property' - expectancies that, if
sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and pay
for before it takes over the management of the landowner's
property.' '71
-' 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
- 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
1, Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179.
[VOL. 5:9
BROAD FORM DEED
In another case, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,2 the Supreme
Court employed the same logic and reached the same result. The
Monsanto Company had submitted trade secrets to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency pursuant to a federal statute which
guaranteed to the company both nondisclosure and exclusive use
of the submitted material. Later, the statute was amended to
permit the EPA to disclose trade secrets and to allow other
companies to use the information. The Supreme Court held that
the disclosure authorized by the statutory amendments "would
frustrate Monsanto's reasonable investment-backed expectation
with respect to its control over the use and dissemination of the
data it had submitted."
'7
Until the adoption of the Broad Form Deed Amendment in
1988, Kentucky law never wavered from consistently upholding
the right of the mineral estate owner claiming under a broad
form deed to employ modern mining methods to extract its
coal.7" The state itself created the mineral owner's expectation.
Also, the Kentucky mineral owner's expectation that it could
adopt newer, cheaper, and safer mining methods as those meth-
ods were developed was an integral part of the value of the
mineral estate in Kentucky. That value is reflected in the price
the mineral owner paid for that interest. Such a reasonable
expectation, backed by actual investment of money by the min-
eral owner, is a form of property protected by the fifth amend-
ment.
Constitutionally protected property rights may exist in intan-
gible as well as tangible things. 5 Contract rights have long been
recognized as a form of intangible property for purposes of the
fifth amendment's protections. 76 Contract rights include not only
the express terms of the contract, but also contemporaneous
state law concerning interpretation and enforcement of the con-
tract.77 For example, in one United States Supreme Court case
467 U.S. 986.
" Id. at 1011.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 15-54.
71 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U .S. 986 (trade secrets), axd Louisv ,le Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)(real estate lien),
'6 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16 (1977); see also,
Contributors to Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917); and El Paso
v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 533-34 (Black, J., dissenting)(1965).
17 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 19-20, n. 17; see also Home Building &
Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429-30 (1934); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy,
4 Wall. 535, 550 (1867); and Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 212, 259-60, 297-98 (opinions
of Washington and Thompson, JJ.)(1827).
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a public transit authority issued bonds pursuant to state laws
which placed restrictions on the use the transit authority could
make of the money generated by its transit operations. The
restrictions were state created security provisions for the benefit
of the bond purchasers. The Supreme Court held that the res-
trictions became an integral part of the property rights acquired
by the bondholder pursuant to its contract with the transit
authority. 7 The state could not thereafter retroactively eliminate
the restrictions.
Kentucky's highest court79 has determined that Kentucky's
law is, and always has been, that a mineral owner under a broad
form deed has the right to decide the type of mining method to
use to extract its minerals as long as the mining operation itself
is not conducted in an oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious
manner.8 0 Not a single decision by Kentucky's highest court has
ever denied that right to a mineral owner uader a broad form
deed." l The mineral owner's right to select the method of mining
11 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. 1.
71 The United States Supreme Court will accept as binding upon it the Kentucky
Supreme Court's determination of its own state law. It is not the function of the United
State Supreme Court to construe state law contrary to the construction given it by the
highest court of the state. Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874). See also
Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620-24 (1976); Fuller
v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 42 n. 2 (1974); O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974);
and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 629 (1973).
" In reaching its decision in Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d at 43-44, Kentuck-
y's highest court believed that it was merely applying a "firmly established ... rule of
property law governing the rights under many mineral deeds covering much acreage in
Eastern Kentucky." In Blue Diamond Coal Company v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d at 728,
Kentucky's highest court held that the Buchanan decision permitting the mineral owner
to surface mine its coal without liability for surface damage had "not upset any existing
law .... In Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 305, the Kentucky Supreme Court reaffirmed that
as long as "the method of mining is not oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious, the
minerals may be removed by the owner of the mineral rights, which include the right to
use the surface."
1, Kentucky law concerning the validity and enforceability of the waiver of damage
provision may not have been as consistent as the law's treatment of the mineral estate
owner's right to choose the method by which the coal is extracted. In Mclntire v. Marian
Coal Co., 227 S.W. 298, a deep mining case, the court determined that the mineral
grantee had the right to use as much of the surface as it deemed necessary or convenient
to its mining business, The court indicated that the mineral owner would have to
compensate the surface owner for any improvements it disturbed on the surface. How-
ever, the Mclntire deed, as excerpted in the case, did not include a waiver of damage
provision.
In Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40, the court sustained the validity of an
expressed waiver of damage provision in a broad form deed even when the mineral
estate owner chooses to surface mine the coal. In Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d
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is the contemporaneous Kentucky law incorporated into all broad
form deed contracts executed prior to the adoption of the Broad
Form Deed Amendment. As a form of intangible property, it is
protected by the fifth amendment.1
2
A Kentucky mineral owner whose interest was created by a
broad form deed has a number of property interests as defined
by Kentucky state law. The mineral owner has a property interest
in its right to use and enjoy its minerals by mining them for a
profit. The mineral owner has a reasonable investment-backed
expectation that it can employ the mining method of its choice,
including later-developed methods, to extract its coal. Finally,
the mineral owner has a property interest in its contractual right
to choose the method of mining it will use. Under Kentucky law
that right is an implied term of every broad form deed executed
prior to the 1988 Broad Form Deed Amendment. 3
718, no express waiver of damage provision was in the oil and gas lease. Therefore, the
mineral estate owner was found liable for the damage caused to the surface by the use
of a mining technique not known at the time the lease was executed.
In Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Company, 429 S.W.2d 395, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals reaffirmed the Buchanan decision that a waiver of damage provision in a
broad form deed is enforceable. Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, is the Kentucky
Supreme Court's most recent decision on the validity of waiver of damage provisions.
In that case the court partially overruled Buchanan. The court determined that whenever
a mineral owner under a broad form deed causes injury to the surface while extracting
the minerals, the mineral owner must pay damages to the surface owner. If the convey-
ance expressly sets out the methods of mining that may be employed, the waiver of
damages is valid for any damage caused by the use of such methods. However, the
court expressly excluded from its decision all conveyances by broad form deed, leases
and mining efforts under broad form deeds, made between the effective date of the
Buchanan decision and the date of the Akers decision. Similarly, if a conveyance or
lease was made while Buchanan was in effect, all future conveyances, lease or mining
efforts pertaining to the same property shall continue to be controlled by Buchanan.
12 Arguably, the enforceability and validity of the waiver of damage provision in
broad form deeds were also part of the contemporaneous Kentucky law incorporated
into all broad form deeds. The Kentucky Supreme Court has recognized that, at least
as to conveyances, leases or mining efforts undertaken while the Buchanan decision was
in effect the law of Kentucky, incorporated into those transactions was that the waiver
of damage provision was valid regardless of the particular mining method employed by
the mineral owner. Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 307.
11 The enforceability of a damage waiver in a broad form deed regardless of the
mining method which causes the damage may also be an implied term of the contract
of severance. Id. Although a mineral owner has a property interest in its contract rights
created by a broad form deed, this section of the article will not analyze whether the
Broad Form Deed Amendment effects a "taking" of those property rights. Instead, the
reader is referred to the Contract Clause discussion. See infra text accompanying notes
180-296.
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B. Determining What Constitutes A Public Use
In any taking analysis of the Broad Form Deed Amendment,
it is essential to determine whether the Amendment serves a valid
public purpose. The existence of a valid public purpose is a
necessary prerequisite to the government's exercise of its taking
power . 4 Even a compensated taking would violate the fifth
amendment if it were not for a valid public use. 85 In addition,
the relative strength or weakness of the public use supposedly
served by the governmental action must be weighed against the
magnitude of the interference with the owner's property rights.
A relatively weak public purpose cannot support an extensive
destruction of property rights.
8 6
The scope of the public use requirement of the takings clause
is coterminous with the state's police power. 7 That is, if the
object of the Broad Form Deed Amendment falls within the
state's power to legislate for the health, safety and welfare of
its citizens, the public use requirement is satisfied. Also the
United States Supreme Court generally will not substitute its
judgment for a legislative judgment that a particular law was
enacted for the health, welfare and safety of the state's citizens. 88
However, even though the public use requirement is equated
with the state's police power, the Supreme Court would have a
role to play in determining the constitutionality of the Broad
Form Deed Amendment.
8 9
The Court would have to determine if the stated purposes
of the Amendment are its real purposesY° To do that, it would
examine the operative provisions of the Amendment, not just
the purposes enumerated in the legislative preamble to the
Amendment.9 1 Once the Court ascertained the real purposes of
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
65 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937).
16 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-14, the United States
Supreme Court was reviewing the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Kohler Act. The
Court found that "the extent of the public interest is shown by the statute to be limited
. . " Therefore, the Court concluded that "the statute does not disclose a public
interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally
protected rights."
87 Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S. at 240.
66 Id. at 241.
69 Seven purposes for the Broad Form Deed Amendment appear in the legislative
preamble to the Amendment. See supra note 6.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 486 (1987).
Id. at 487 n. 16; and Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413-14.
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the Amendment, it would then determine if these purposes are
legitimate objectives for the state to pursue.92 For example, if
the real purpose of the Amendment was found to be merely to
serve the private interests of some property owners, the Amend-
ment could not be sustained as a proper exercise of the state's
police power. 93 Even if the Court determined that the real pur-
pose of the Amendment was a legitimate state interest, the Court
would also have to ascertain whether the presumption created
by the Amendment substantially advanced the attainment of
those purposes.
94
The United States Supreme Court has found that a statute's
failure to apply uniformly to mineral transactions strongly in-
dicates the statute does not serve a valid public purpose. The
conclusion that such a statute serves private not public purposes
is particularly cogent when the lack of uniformity of application
is coupled with an extensive interference with the mineral own-
er's ability to extract its coal.
For example, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,95 the
Court found Pennsylvania's Kohler Act constituted an imper-
missible "taking" of the mineral owner's "rights of property
and contract." The Kohler Act prohibited the mining of anthra-
cite coal if the mining would cause the subsidence of any struc-
ture used for human habitation. 96 However, the statutory
prohibition did not apply to the mining of anthracite coal when
the surface owner also owned the mineral estate. 97 The Kohler
Act only prohibited mining which caused subsidence when the
mineral owner did the mining.
The United States Supreme Court concluded that because of
the lack of uniformity in the application of the Act's prohibitions
"the extent of the public interest is shown . . .to be limited." 98
The Court rejected the Pennsylvania legislature's determination
that the Kohler Act was a proper exercise of the state's police
12 Keystone Bitumnious Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. at 486.
93 Id. at 484; and Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S. at 245.
, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. at 485; Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260 (1980); and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
127 (1978). See also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 834 and n.
3 (1987).
" Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413-14.
Id. at 412-13.
9' Id. at 414.
9I Id.
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power. Instead, the Court determined the Act involved a bal-
ancing of the private economic interests of surface owners against
the private interests of the mineral owners. As such, the Act
primarily served private interests and not the interests of the
public's health or safety. 99
While the Supreme Court recognized there could be a slight
public interest even in the ordering of private affairs, the Court's
decision to invalidate the Kohler Act as an impermissible taking
rested partly on the magnitude of the interference with the
mineral owner's property and contract rights. Under the original.
deeds which severed the mineral estate from the surface, the
mineral owner contracted for the right to mine the coal. The
value of this right to mine was in the mineral owner's ability to
exercise that right with a profit. The Supreme Court found that
the Kohler Act made it commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal.' °° Thus, even if the Kohler Act served some slight
public interest, it was still an impermissible taking. The public
interest was not sufficient to warrant such an extensive destruc-
tion of the mineral owner's property rights.' 0'
Finally, the Court found the state's claimed interest in the
surface owner's personal safety was also insufficient predicate
to sustain the Kohler Act. The Supreme Court found that the
state's interest in the personal safety of the surface owner could
easily have been accommodated by requiring the mineral owner
to give notice to the surface owner of its intent to mine.
102 It
was relevant to the Court's decision that a simple alternative
was available which was significantly less destructive of property
rights than the method chosen. The existence of an alternative
supported the Court's determination that the real purpose of the
Kohler Act was merely to augment the private property rights
of the surface owner at the expense of the property rights of the
mineral owner.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis'03 sustaining Pennsylvania's Subsi-
dence Act against a takings challenge does not represent a retreat
or departure from the Court's rationale in Pennsylvania Coal.
9 Id.
'9 Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414.
10, Id.
102 Id.
,0 480 U.S. 470.
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Both before and after the Keystone decision, courts must deter-
mine the legislation's true purposes by examining the operative
provisions of a statute, not just its stated purposes. Also state
laws which infringe on property rights must serve public, not
private, purposes. State laws which significantly interfere with
previously existing property rights must be supported by more
weighty public purposes than are necessary to support laws which
only minimally interfere with property rights. Both before and
after the Keystone decision, the presence or absence of an alter-
native method less destructive of property rights than the method
chosen by the state to accomplish its purpose is relevant in
determining whether the stated purpose is the real purpose of
the statute. The Keystone decision merely applies the principles
employed in Pennsylvania Coal to another fact situation. Since
the facts and the acts were different, it is not surprising that the
results were different, too.
Both the Subsidence Act sustained by the Supreme Court in
Keystone and the Kohler Act struck by the Court in Pennsylvania
Coal purported to regulate coal mining that caused subsidence
damage to pre-existing public buildings, dwellings and cemeter-
ies.' °4 But that is the extent of the similarity between the two
legislative enactments.
The constitutionally permissible Subsidence Act, unlike the
Kohler Act, did not exempt mining operations which cause sub-
sidence merely because a person who owns both the mineral and
surface estates conducts the mining. 05 Neither the surface owner
nor the mineral owner acting alone or in concert could waive
the requirements of the Subsidence Act.' °6 The United States
Supreme Court found that the uniform application of the Sub-
sidence Act was a strong indication that the statute was enacted
for the alleged purposes of protecting the health, safety and
welfare of Pennsylvania's citizens and not to confer a benefit
on surface owners. 0 7 The Keystone Court was further persuaded
that the legislative purposes set forth in the Subsidence Act were
genuine because the United States District Court for the Western
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. at 476 and Pennsylvania Coal, 260
U.S. at 412-13.
05 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. at 486.
,0 The current surface owner can only waive the protection of the Act if the state
consents. Id. See also, 25 PA. CODE § 89.145(b)(1983).
t07 Id.
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District of Pennsylvania and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit had reached that conclusion.108
The Subsidence Act permitted the mineral owner to remove
507o of the coal beneath a protected structure. The remaining
coal had to be left in place to provide surface support. °9 Evi-
dence was presented at trial that the Subsidence Act only re-
quired the challengers to leave 270 of all their coal unmined." 0
The Kohler Act, on the other hand, had made it commercially
impracticable for the challengers to mine any of their coal. As
the impact of the Subsidence Act on the mineral owners' right
to mine their coal was relatively small, the Supreme Court found
that the state's interest was sufficiently weighty to sustain the
statute from a takings challenge."'l
The Keystone Court also found that the challengers to the
Subsidence Act could not suggest any alternative methods the
state could use to achieve its purposes. 112 This was not true of
the challengers of the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania Coal. The
Keystone Court viewed the lack of readily employable alterna-
tives as further support for its determination "that the details
of the statute do not call the stated public purposes into ques-
tion."113
Kentucky's Broad Form Deed Amendment has many of the
indicia identified in the Keystone and Pennsylvania Coal cases
of a law enacted solely for the benefit of private parties-in this
case surface owners. The operative provisions of the Amendment
create a presumption applicable to all broad form deeds. 114 The
IN Id.
09 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 477.
IoId. at 496.
Id. at 484, n. 13 and 485.
22 Id. at 486.
Id. at 487, n. 16.
1" The language of the Amendment describing the instruments which are subject
to the Amendment is confusing. The Amendment's presumption applies to:
any instrument ...purporting to sever the surface and mineral estates or
to grant a right to extract minerals, which [1] fails to state or describe in
express and specific terms the method of coal extraction to be employed,
or [2] where said instrument contains language subordinating the surface
estate to the mineral estate .... KY. CONST. § 19(2).
Generally, broad form deeds do not specify the method of coal extraction. Specif-
ically, broad form deeds do not specify surface mining as a method of coal extraction
because surface mining as practiced today was "non-existent in the early 1900s, when
most, if not all, of the broad form deeds were executed." Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 309.
Also, if a broad form deed did specify surface mining as a method of coal extraction,
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presumption is that the parties to a broad form deed intended
that the coal be:
* . .extracted only by the method or methods of commercial
coal extraction commonly known to be in use in Kentucky in
the area affected at the time the instrument was executed, and
that the mineral estate be dominant to the surface estate for
the purposes of coal extraction by only the method or methods
of commercial coal extraction commonly known to be in use
in Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument
was executed."'
In theory, mineral owners can rebut this presumption. But it
can only be done by "clear and convincing evidence" that the
original parties to the broad form deed intended to permit
"methods of coal extraction not commonly known to be in use
in Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument was
executed.'""6 The Kentucky Supreme Court has taken judicial
notice that no such evidence is available today."17 Thus, as to
mineral owners, the Amendment's presumption is a positive rule
of law because it is irrebuttable in fact.
The Amendment's substantive rule of law only binds mineral
owners." 8 It prohibits mineral owners from employing later-
developed mining methods to extract their coal, but it does not
prohibit a surface owner from permitting the use of modern
but contained language subordinating the surface estate to the mineral estate the Amend-
ment would be applicable." Id. at 298 (a broad form deed is a conveyance which
specifically grants to the grantee "all surface rights grantee deems necessary or convenient
for the full and free exercise and enjoyment of the minerals conveyed." Most broad
form deeds reserve to the grantor "only such surface rights as may be consistent with
the mineral rights conveyed"). For an example of broad form deed language, see Watson
v. Kenlick Coal Co., 498 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1974). Thus, if the Amendment means
what it says, a broad form deed which specifies that surface mining is a method by
which the coal may be extracted is nonetheless subject to the presumption because the
deed contains language subordinating the surface estate to the mineral estate.
"I Ky. CONST. § 19(2).
16 Id. The Amendment creates a number of conceptual dilemmas. The language of
the Amendment purports to make the presumption applicable to deeds which specify
the method of coal extraction, but subordinate the surface estate to the mineral estate.
What additional evidence, beyond the express words of the deed, would the grantee
have to produce to establish that the parties intended to permit the method of coal
extraction already expressly permitted by the words of the deed? Also, how can a current
mineral owner produce evidence that the original parties expressly intended to permit a
modern method of mining which by definition is a mining method not known at the
time the deed was originally executed?
"I Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 309.
118 Id.
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mining methods. The surface owner can, at any time, unilaterally
authorize the mineral owner to use modern mining techniques."19
If the mineral owner is unable to overcome the Amendment's
presumption and is unable to secure the consent of the surface
owner, it cannot employ modern mining methods to extract its
coal. However, if the mineral owner is unable to overcome the
Amendment's presumption, but is able to secure consent of the
surface owner, no doubt at a price, the mineral owner can use
modern mining technology. In light of such an anomalous result,
it is impossible to argue that the Amendment embodies any
public purpose. The private decision of a private party (in this
case the surface owner), unregulated by any governmental over-
sight, can override whatever purposes the Amendment was sup-
posed to serve. The real purpose of the Amendment is revealed
in the creation of this unilateral power in the surface owner to
consent to mining by modern mining methods. It demonstrates
that the Amendment was actually intended to readjust the re-
spective rights of the mineral and surface owners in favor of the
surface estate.
The Amendment, like the Kohler Act, is an attempt to
enhance the private economic interests of surface owners at the
expense of the mineral owners. Kentucky's Supreme Court has
indicated its agreement with this characterization of the real
purpose of the Amendment. 120 In 1984 the Kentucky legislature
passed the Mineral Deed Act,'12 which contained the same pro-
visions and preamble as the Broad Form Deed Amendment. In
Akers v. Baldwin'22 the Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated the
Mineral Deed Act as it applied to most broad form deeds. The
Court found the Act was similar in tactics to an earlier uncon-
stitutional attempt by the legislature "to change the relative legal
rights and economic bargaining positions of many private parties
under their contracts." 1
23
,,9 To assume that in many instances the surface owner would be willing, for a
price, to exercise its right to authorize the use of modern mining techniques would not
be unreasonable.
Akers, 736 S.W,2d 294.
,1 Act of July 13, 1984, ch. 28, 1984 Ky. Acts 47 [codified at KRS §§ 381.930-
.945 (1984)].
2 Akers, 736 S.W.2d 294.
2I Id. at 310. The Court compared the statute to the legislature's action which was




The Broad Form Deed Amendment resembles the unconsti-
tutional Kohler Act more than the constitutional Subsidence Act
because it, too, totally prohibits mining "certain coal."' 2 4 In the
Akers decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court determined that
the effect of the Mineral Deed Act and, by extension, the Broad
Form Deed Amendment, was to prevent all surface mining of
coal to which it applied." 5 Much of the remaining coal in Ken-
tucky can be removed only by mining methods which came into
existence long after the execution of most broad form deeds.'
26
It is either commercially impractical or technically impossible to
remove most of Kentucky's remaining coal by turn-of-the-cen-
tury, deep shaft mining methods. 27 The Amendment erects an
insurmountable impediment to that coal's extraction.
The purposes enumerated in the preamble to the Broad Form
Deed Amendment are merely attempts to create a patina of
legitimacy. To survive constitutional scrutiny, the expressed pur-
poses must be the real purposes of the Amendment and not
merely legislative attempts to rationalize the Amendment. If the
Amendment's express purposes are to legitimate the Amend-
ment, the presumption created by the Amendment must sub-
stantially advance the attainment of those purposes.121 If the
presumption does not do that, then no matter how legitimate
the express purposes are in the abstract they can not provide a
basis for determining that this particular amendment to the
Kentucky Constitution serves a valid public purpose.
Three of the seven expressed purposes of the Amendment 2 9
involve claims that the presumption is intended to clarify the
rights of mineral and surface owners to use the surface land by
eliminating uncertainty and by providing uniformity in the law.
The truth is that Kentucky law has been clear, certain and
Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414.
,2 Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 308-9. The effect of the Amendment is also to prohibit
auger mining, longwall mining and continuous mining techniques as they were not mining
methods in use at the time most broad form deeds were executed.
,26 Kentucky has 95,834.73 million short-tons of remaining coal reserves. J. COBB,
R. BRANT, J. CURRENS, A. WILLIAMSON, KENTUCKY COAL (1985).
"I' Approximately a third of all of Eastern Kentucky's demonstrated coal reserve
base is in coal which is mined by surface mining. C. HARVEY, COAL IN APPALACHIA, 62
(1985).
"I Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. at 485; Agins, 447 U.S. at 260; and
Penn Central Transportation Co., 438 U.S. at 127, see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 and
n. 3.
,29 See supra note 6 for the complete text of the purposes of the Amendment.
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uniform from its inception concerning the respective rights of
the parties to a broad form deed to use the surface of the land.
As discussed earlier in this article,'30 the mineral owner in Ken-
tucky has always had the right to use the surface to extract its
coal by any method of coal mining it chose to employ. Thus,
under the guise of achieving a legitimate goal, the Amendment
actually undoes the clarity of Kentucky's law on this point.
The Amendment also creates confusion where none existed.
Litigation has already risen to determine what types of convey-
ances and mining methods are subject to the Amendment's
presumption. For example,'' the owner of the top seams of coal
under a piece of land in eastern Kentucky has taken the position
that the Broad Form Deed Amendment prohibits the mining of
the lower seams of coal by any method other than room and
pillar. The owner of the upper seams seeks to prevent the owner
of the lower seams from longwall mining because longwall min-
ing methods were not in common use in eastern Kentucky in
1926 when the severance deed was executed.
Two other alleged purposes of the Amendment are to secure
titles to land and improvements and to promote the free alien-
ability of land.'32 In Texaco v. Short,'33 the United States Su-
preme Court recognized that both these goals are valid public
purposes for a state to pursue. However, merely reciting these
two purposes does not sustain the Broad Form Deed Amend-
ment. The creation of a presumption against the use of modern
mining methods to extract coal bears no relationship, substantial
or otherwise, to promoting security of land titles or the free
alienability of land.
Indiana's Dormant Mineral Interest Act'34 was at issue in
Texaco. That act provided that a severed mineral interest not
used for a period of 20 years automatically lapsed and reverted
to the current surface owner. The mineral owner could prevent
the lapse of its unused mineral interest by filing a statement of
claim in the local county recorder's office before the end of the
twenty-year period of nonuse or within a two-year grace period
after the effective date of the Act. Indiana's highest court had
130 See supra text accompanying notes 15-54.
,' U.S. v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co., No. 78-169 (E.D.Ky. 1978).
2 See supra note 6 for the complete text of the purposes of the Amendment.
1 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
114 Id. at 518 and n.l.
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determined that the existence of stale and abandoned mineral
interests created uncertainties in land titles, which, in turn, im-
peded the development of the mineral interests as well as the
surface. "I
The relationship between the Dormant Mineral Act's objec-
tive of encouraging the productive use of the mineral and surface
estates and the operative provisions of the Act is clear. Stale
and abandoned mineral interests create uncertainties in titles. If
the title to a mineral interest is uncertain neither the mineral
estate nor the surface estate will be put to productive use until
this cloud on the mineral title is removed. The Dormant Mineral
Act eliminates this impediment to the productive development
of the land and its minerals by clearing the title to unused
mineral interests. After twenty years of nonuse and nonrecord-
ing, the mineral interest is presumed to be abandoned. Title to
the mineral estate is returned to the owner of the surface estate,
making the entire productive potential of the property available
for exploitation.
With the Broad Form Deed Amendment, on the other hand,
there is no relationship between its express objectives to secure
titles and promote the free alienability of land and the Amend-
ment's presumption against the right of the mineral owner to
use modern mining techniques. Title to real property interests is
insecure when a cloud is on the title. A cloud on the title arises
when the ownership of the estate cannot be ascertained with
certainty because of outstanding adverse claims or long periods
of nonuse of the property. The type of mining method a mineral
owner may or may not use to extract its coal is not an adverse
claim of ownership of an interest in the surface estate. Using
modern mining methods to extract coal is unrelated to the title
problems caused by nonuse or abandonment.
The Broad Form Deed Amendment does not affect the free
alienability of land. If the Amendment's presumption is sus-
tained the surface owner's interest will become more valuable,
but it will be no more or less alienable. The irrebuttable nature
of the presumption means the surface owner will be able to
prohibit or permit the mineral owner to use modern mining
methods. That power can be exploited economically by the sur-
face owner to force the mineral owner to purchase the right to
"I Id. at 523.
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use modern mining techniques from the surface owner. Thus,
ownership of the surface may be seen as more desirable than it
has been in the past. But, increasing or decreasing the economic
desirability of the ownership of a particular property interest is
totally unrelated to whether the interest is freely alienable. Un-
resolved adverse claims against the property and long periods of
nonuse indicating possible abandonment impede the free alien-
ability of land. The type of mining method the mineral estate
owner may use to extract its coal does not.
The express purposes the Amendment is supposed to accom-
plish of securing title and promoting the free alienability of land
are not the real purposes of the Amendment. They are merely
recitations of theoretically permissible purposes unrelated in any
way to the operative provisions of the Amendment.
A similar type of subterfuge is at work in the part of the
Amendment's preamble in which it is claimed that the Amend-
ment will:
[Piromote the conservation and the full and efficient use of
all natural resources of the state, including the land, the mak-
ing of improvements to the land, the growth of agriculture,
the development of new industry and the general economic
well-being of the state and its people[.] 136
This alleged purpose is cast in words and phrases meant to create
the impression that the state is exercising its power to legislate
for the health, safety and welfare of its citizens.
37
Kentucky certainly has a legitimate interest in providing for
the conservation of surface lands which may be affected by the
use of modern mining methods such as surface mining or au-
guring. A law, whether created by statute or constitutional
amendment, seeking to accomplish such a purpose would have
a valid public purpose. Pennsylvania's Subsidence Act was sus-
tained by the United States Supreme Court in Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis,3 5 because the Act was a
valid land use regulation which did not deny the mineral owner
the economically viable use of its land.
,36 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 117.
"I The purposes are contradictory. For example, the Amendment is supposed to
promote the conservation of all of the state's natural resources while at the same time
it is supposed to promote the full use of these very same resources.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. 470.
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Conservation of surface land or other natural resources of
the state is not the real purpose of the Broad Form Deed
Amendment. A cursory perusal of the operative provisions of
the Amendment demonstrates that the Amendment was never
intended to conserve surface land. Any conservation objective
can be thwarted by the unilateral action of private individuals,
since the Amendment does not forbid or regulate mining which
causes surface damage. It merely places in the hands of the
surface owner the option to permit (for a price) or not permit
such mining. There is no real relationship between the presump-
tion against the use of after-developed mining methods and the
conservation claims in the Amendment's preamble. The surface
owner can decide to authorize the use of modern mining tech-
niques even if the use of such methods would actually impede
the attainment of the state's alleged goals of promoting the
conservation and full use of all the state's natural resources.
Thus, the Broad Form Deed Amendment is not a land use
regulation and it does not facilitate conservation.
Nor is the Amendment an exercise of the state's police power
to protect the public health and welfare. It permits private parties
to consent to the use of modern mining methods to extract coal.
Consequently the legislature must have determined that using
such mining techniques does not impede the state's public health
and welfare goals of promoting the conservation and full use of
the state's natural resources, making improvements to the land,
encouraging the growth of agriculture, and developing new in-
dustry and the general economic well-being of the state. Since
modern mining methods do not impede these goals, a presump-
tion against modern mining methods does not improve the gen-
eral public health and welfare. Thus, the Amendment's
presumption cannot find its justification in the claim that it is
an exercise of the police power exerted in the interest of the
public. 139
,19 Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 120-21 (1928). A trust company
which owned a home for elderly people in a residential area of Seattle was denied a
permit to enlarge the structure. The zoning ordinance provided that such a building
should be permitted if the written consent of two-thirds of the property owners within
400 feet of the proposed building consented. The denial was based upon the sole ground
that the trust company had not obtainedthe consent of the requisite number of sur-
rounding property owners. The consent requirement was struck as violative of the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
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If the Amendment's purpose was to improve the public
health and welfare, the burden imposed by the Amendment
should be shared by the general public. As applied to coal which
can only be extracted by later-developed mining methods, the
Amendment totally denies the mineral owner the ability to ex-
ercise its right to use its property for a profit. Moreover, the
state has readily available alternative methods to achieve the
goal of conserving and making full use of its natural resources.
For example, Kentucky could strengthen its present laws regu-
lating surface mining and reclamation operations. 4° This would
be consistent with the fifth amendment and would avoid forcing
only mineral owners to bear the public burden of conserving
surface land. This burden "in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.' ' 4' The Amendment does not
spread the burden among the general public. Nor does it benefit
the general public since it allows individual surface owners to
choose whether to allow modern mining methods. A law which
allows individuals to have this option does not benefit the general
public and is not a valid exercise of the state's police power.
The preamble to the Amendment contains the bald assertion
that "we should codify a rule of construction for mineral deeds
relating to coal extraction so as to implement the intention of
the parties at the time the instrument was created.' '14  Most
broad form deeds were executed in the early part of this century.
Therefore, the only evidence that remains for determining the
original parties' intentions is the words they used in their deed.
Since their deed, a contract, is unambiguous, no need exists for
a special rule of construction as to intention.
As discussed earlier,'14 a broad form deed contains a con-
veyance of "all" the minerals described in the deed as well as a
very lengthy description of the mining rights granted to the
mineral owner. The deed also expressly conveys to the mineral
owner such surface rights as the mineral owner deems "necessary
or convenient" for the full and free exercise and enjoyment of
its minerals. Finally, the deed reserves to the surface owner only
Although Kentucky administers the Federal Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act, the Kentucky legislature affirmatively chose not to make Kentucky's surface
mining and reclamation laws more stringent than the minimum required by federal law.
KRS § 350.025.
14 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
"1 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 117.
' See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
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such surface rights as may be consistent with the rights granted
to the mineral owner.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has consistently held that the
language of a broad form deed demonstrates the parties intended
to permit the mineral owner to remove the minerals by any
method it chose to employ.'" As recently as 1987, the Kentucky's
highest court said:
The provisions in typical broad form deeds are, beyond cavil,
clear and unambiguous. They are, in fact, overwhelming in
their language to demonstrate an intent to convey away the
rights to the minerals described. The right to the minerals
carries with it the right to mine them. That a certain method
of mining was known at the time the document was executed
is simply not relevant. A sale implies the right to obtain and
use the item sold. Without it there is, in effect, no sale. It can
be argued that the parties in their wisdom recognized that
fertile minds will always seek and achieve new ways of doing
things, and therefore generally, if not specifically, contem-
plated new mining techniques which were faster, cheaper and
better. (Emphasis in original)
145
The Amendment's presumption actually does violence to the
probable intention of the original parties because it requires the
courts to ignore the natural import of the words the original
parties actually used. Thus, as the Kentucky Supreme Court
recognized when it struck the Mineral Deed Act which contained
the identical presumption, a presumption against the right of
the mineral estate owner to employ modern mining methods is
not substantially related to the implementation of the original
parties' true intention. 146
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the stated pur-
poses of the Broad Form Deed Amendment are not the real
purpose. The real purpose is to readjust the relative legal rights
and economic bargaining position of the parties to a broad form
deed in favor of the surface owner. Such a purpose is not a
valid public one.
C. Determining What Constitutes A Taking
An inherent tension exists between the Constitution's prohi-
bitions against the taking of private property for public use
I" See supra text accompanying notes 15-54.
141 Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 304-5 (emphasis in original).
,16 Id. at 309.
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without just compensation and the reality that government could
not go on if the state had to pay for every change in its general
laws which diminished values incident to property.'4 7 In an at-
tempt to resolve this tension, the United States Supreme Court
has held that the fifth amendment's guarantee does not forbid
all interferences with property rights. Rather, it is designed to
bar the government from "forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.'
4 8
The United States Supreme Court has not articulated a set
formula for determining when "fairness and justice" requires
the state to pay compensation for the economic injury caused
by its action.149 Instead, the Court examines each allegation of
a taking on a case-by-case basis to determine "whether a partic-
ular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's
failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it .... 50
The Supreme Court's prior decisions establish three partic-
ularly significant factors in making a takings determination: (1)
the character of the governmental action; (2) its economic im-
pact; and (3) its interference with the reasonable investment-
backed expectations of the property owner.'' All three factors
need not be present for the Court to find a taking.
1 2
1. The Character of the Governmental Action
The starting point in a takings analysis is the character of
the governmental action. When the governmental action is a
"I Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413.
"4 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (a taking was found when the transfer to the federal
government of title to certain property prevented a material supplier from enforcing its
lien against the property); see also Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123-24 (a
taking was not found when the city's preservation law was employed to deny the owner
of Grand Central Station permission to build a multi-story office building above the
station).
"I Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
-50 Id.
"I Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
12 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
A New York statute required landlords to permit a cable television company to install
its equipment on the landlord's building. The landlord was only entitled to such payment
from the company as determined by a state commission. The commission determined
that a one-time payment of $1 was reasonable. Even though the cables installed by the
company had only a deminimus economic impact when measured against the landlord's
aggregate rights in its building, an unconstitutional taking had occurred.
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direct, physical invasion of the complainant's property, the Court
will find a taking even though the occupation has only a minimal
economic impact on the owner's property."' It is as though the
Court makes no distinction between grand and petty larceny in
a direct, physical invasion case. Similarly, the Court readily finds
an impermissible taking when the government appropriates a
person's property for the government's own use.'54 Even a direct
physical invasion or appropriation does not, however, require
compensation if the government is acting to prevent an impend-
ing danger.' 55 The Broad Form Deed Amendment's presumption
against modern mining methods involves neither a physical in-
vasion of the mineral estate nor an appropriation of the mineral
owner's property for the government's own use.
At the other end of the spectrum from physical invasion and
taking for the government's own use is governmental action to
abate or prevent a nuisance. When the state acts to restrain uses
of property that are tantamount to a public nuisance, 5 6 the
Court is very hesitant to find a taking.'57 In his recent dissent
in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis,58 Justice
"s Id. See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. at 488, n. 18.
, Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-64 (1980). A
Florida statute authorized the county to take all interest accruing on interpleader funds
while the funds were deposited with the county court. This was an unconstitutional
taking of the beneficial use of the fund owner's property while it was deposited with
the court. See also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)(the Court found a
taking when the government used the air space above the claimants' land as a flight
path for military aircraft).
," Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n.,
480 U.S. at 491-92, the Court said, "[l1ong ago it was recognized that all property in
this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be
injurious to the community." See also First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County,
482 U.S. 304, 313 (1987) in which the Court said "[w]e accordingly have no occasion
to decide . . . whether the county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking
had occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the
State's authority to enact safety regulations." See also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Corp.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926) and Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508
(1923).
116 In upholding a state order that the owners of cedar trees had to destroy the
trees to prevent the spread of a disease to nearby apple orchatds, the Court did not
consider it necessary to "weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars
constitute a nuisance according to the common law; or whether they may be so declared
by statute." Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280. But, "[t]he nuisance exception to the
taking guarantee ... is not coterminous with the police power itself." Penn Central
Transportation Co., 438 U.S. at 145 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
t17 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. at 491.
"8 Id. at 492-93. But see id. at 511-14 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
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Rehnquist indicated this "nuisance exception," standing alone,
regardless of the economic impact on the property owner, might
support the Court's holding that the Subsidence Act did not
constitute a taking. Even if statutes prohibiting- noxious uses of
property are exempted from the just compensation clause of the
fifth amendment, the Broad Form Deed Amendment does not
come within that nuisance exception.
In the past unregulated or underregulated surface mining
activities were fairly susceptible to being characterized as noxious
uses, since the mining activities caused significant off-site dam-
age. However, the Amendment is not intended to regulate nox-
ious use or nuisance-like activity. On its face, the Amendment
purports to merely create a presumption applicable to the inter-
pretation of broad form deeds. All of the Supreme Court's
previous decisions employing the "nuisance rationale," in whole
or in part, to sustain a law from a takings challenge have
involved governmental acts which expressly purported to prohibit
certain noxious land uses.5 9 As discussed earlier in this article,
the central purpose of the Broad Form Deed Amendment is "to
change the relative legal rights and economic bargaining posi-
tions" of the surface and mineral owners under a broad form
deed.160 Such a purpose belies any attempt to characterize the
Amendment as a regulation of a nuisance or noxious use.
The Amendment seeks to achieve its objective by creating
what amounts to a positive rule of law that mineral owners
cannot employ modern mining methods to extract their coal.'
6
1
The surface owner, however, can unilaterally authorize the min-
eral owner to use modern mining methods. The Amendment is
therefore not analogous to the nuisance prohibition statutes the
Court has previously sustained. The Amendment does not strictly
prohibit any type of coal mining regardless of whether the min-
ing activity is tantamount to a public nuisance. It merely gives
"5 See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(Pennsylvania's Subsidence Act); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264 (1981)(Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977); Hodel v. Indiana,
452 U.S. 314 (1981)(Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977); Hadacheck
v. Sebastion, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)(City of Los Angeles Ordinance prohibiting the oper-
ation of brickyards within the city limits); and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)(state
constitutional amendment prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor).
1 Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 310. For complete discussion of the purpose of the
Amendment, see supra text accompanying notes 11-54.
,6, Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 308-9.
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the surface owner the power to grant or withhold that right
from the mineral owner for any (or no) reason.
When the governmental act is not a physical invasion or an
appropriation of the complainant's property and it is not a
restraint on property uses which are tantamount to a public
nuisance, the takings analysis becomes more complicated. Al-
though the character of the governmental act remains a factor,
the economic impact of the state's action and its interference
with the reasonable, investment-backed expectations of the prop-
erty owner also become a part of the analysis.
2. Economic Impact
The United States Supreme Court has resolved a number of
takings challenges to laws regulating land uses which could not
be properly characterized as tantamount to a public nuisance or
noxious use. For example, in Andrus v. Allard,162 the Eagle
Protection Act prohibited a person from selling eagle feathers
even if the feathers were legally acquired before the Eagle Pro-
tection Act was enacted. The Court sustained the statute even
though it deprived the owner of the most profitable use of its
property. The Court said that "[a]t least where an owner pos-
sesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one
'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate
must be viewed in its entirety.' ' 163 Thus, the Court found no
taking because the owners were not deprived of all the value of
their property.
In Agins v. City of Tiburon,'16 the Supreme Court rejected
a takings challenge to a city zoning ordinance for the same
reasons. After a property owner acquired five acres of unim-
proved land, the city adopted a zoning ordinance. Under the
terms of the ordinance, the property owner was limited to de-
veloping the land to a maximum of five single-family residences.
The Supreme Court determined that the mere enactment of a
comprehensive land use regulatory scheme does not constitute a
W 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
161 Id. at 65-66.
-6 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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taking unless it denies the owner all economically viable use of
its land.
1 65
The Broad Form Deed Amendment works an impermissible
taking under the Fifth Amendment, because it deprives mineral
owners of certain coal of all economically viable use of their
property. For all intents and purposes, the value of the owner-
ship of coal consists only of the right to mine it for a profit.'6
This is the only strand in a mineral owner's bundle of property
rights in its minerals. Thus, when a state law makes it impossible,
commercially or technologically, to mine the coal, that act de-
prives the mineral owner of all economically viable uses of its
property. A state action making it impossible for a mineral
owner to mine its coal cannot be sustained by characterizing it
as a destruction of only one strand in the bundle of property
rights of the mineral owner.
The Amendment creates a presumption that modern mining
methods cannot be employed by the mineral owner to extract its
coal. As to any mineral owners who cannot overcome the pre-
sumption, the Amendment functions as a positive rule of law.
Such mineral owners are barred from using surface mining,
auger mining, longwall mining, continuous seam mining and
other modern mining technologies because the methods did not
exist at the time the original broad form deeds were executed.
67
Those mineral owners are confined to extracting their coal by
the deepshaft mining methods which existed in the early part of
this century. However, removing much of Kentucky's remaining
coal by such antiquated mining techniques is neither commer-
cially nor technically feasible. Thus, the Amendment is unlike
those state actions which were sustained by the Supreme Court
because they merely deprived the property owner of the most
profitable use of its property. 168 The Amendment effects a total
taking of the property of those mineral owners who cannot
6 Id. at 260. See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. 470; Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264; and Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104. An example of a statute which did constitute an
impermissible taking because it deprived the property owner of all use of its property
can be found in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393.
1 Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414-15.
,67 Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 308-9.
I See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (zoning ordinance limited the property
owner to building one to five single-family dwellings on its property); Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51 (Eagle Protection Act prohibited the owner of eagle feathers from selling
them, but permitted exhibition of the feathers for an admission charge).
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overcome the presumption. It denies them the ability to mine
their coal at all by making it physically impossible or commer-
cially impracticable to remove the coal.
69
3. Investment-backed Expectations
Even if the Board Form Deed Amendment was not a total
taking of the mineral owner's property, the Supreme Court's
takings jurisprudence recognizes a governmental act may be
constitutionally impermissible when it materially interferes with
the reasonable investment-backed expectations of a property
owner. 170 Not all expectations concerning the use of property
constitute a constitutionally protected reasonable, investment-
backed expectation. However, a Kentucky mineral owner whose
property interest was created by a broad form deed executed
prior to the Amendment does have such a protectable property
interest. 171
For at least seventy years, Kentucky's highest court has
consistently recognized that under a broad form deed the mineral
estate is dominant to the surface estate.' 72 The Court has found
that a mineral conveyance granting surface rights "necessary and
convenient for mining" means that the only restriction upon
mining methods is that mining operation may not be conducted
in an oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious manner. 73 Ab-
sent oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious mining conduct,
the express damage waiver provision embodies the original par-
ties' agreement that damage to the surface, regardless of the
mining technique employed, will not result in any liability.
74
Current owners of coal mineral estates acquired their prop-
erty interests and made enormous financial investments in rea-
sonable reliance on these long established legal principles. It is
axiomatic that the value of a mineral estate in large part depends
on the cost of extracting the mineral. Thus, it is not illogical to
,1 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (a material supplier's lien was
totally destroyed when its lien against a ship could not be enforced because title to the
ship had been transferred to the United States government); and Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (Kohler Act made it commercially impracticable to mine
anthracite coal in Pennsylvania).
170 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. at 499.
,7, See supra text accompanying notes 64-74.
171 Bluegrass Coal Corp. v. Combs, 182 S.W. 207, 212 (Ky. 1916).
,71 Case, 276 S.W. at 574.
,74 Buchanan, 290 S.W.2d at 43.
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assume that the pre-Amendment price of mineral estates in coal
reflected the fact that the coal could be extracted by new mining
techniques as well as by those mining techniques employed at
the time the original broad form deed was executed. Reliance
on the respective rights of the parties to a broad form deed as
defined by the Kentucky courts has been greatest among those
contemporary mineral owners who purchased coal which can
only be extracted by surface mining or some other mining tech-
nique not known at the time the mineral estate was severed. The
Amendment totally impairs the value of a such a mineral estate,
because it functionally prohibits the mining of such coal. Thus,
the reasonable, investment-backed reliance of purchasers of such
mineral estates in coal has been defeated by the Amendment.
The economic value of the right to employ modern mining
methods is significant. Without that right, the mineral owner
must use turn-of-the-century mining methods, purchase the right
to employ modern mining methods from the surface owner, or
refrain from mining. Thus, the retroactive application of the
Broad Form Deed Amendment would significantly interfere with
the reasonable investment-backed expectations of Kentucky min-
eral owners claiming under broad form deeds executed prior to
the adoption of the Amendment.
The takings issue arises in the context of Kentucky's Broad
Form Deed Amendment 75 because the Amendment changes the
property rights of mineral owners whose interests were created
by broad form deeds. Before the enactment of the Amendment,
a mineral owner in Kentucky who held under a broad form deed
had the right to choose any method to mine the coal including
modern surface mining methods. 176 The only limitation on this
right was that the mining operation could not be conducted in
an oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious manner.
77
Since Kentucky enacted the Amendment, the same mineral
owner holding under the same broad form deed may now only
use those mining methods which were expressly provided for in
the deed or which were in common use when its deed was
executed. A contemporary mineral owner in Kentucky can em-
ploy other mining techniques only if it establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that the original parties to the broad form
"I KY. CONST. § 19(2).
,76 Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 305.
"I Blue Diamond Coal v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d at 727.
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deed intended to permit extracting coal by later-developed min-
ing methods.
Surface mining as practiced today was not in use at the time
most broad form deeds were executed.1 78 It is impossible to
establish by any evidence that this not-yet-developed mining
method was in common use when the deed was originally exe-
cuted. It is also highly improbable that the original parties to
the broad form deed expressly provided for the use of a mining
method which was not yet developed. Such prescience is rare.
As the Kentucky Supreme Court has noted, the Amendment's
presumption effectively eliminates the mineral owners pre-
Amendment legal right to use modern mining techniques to
extract its coal.' 79 The Amendment forces the current mineral
owner to repurchase that right from the surface owner.
Because the Amendment deprives mineral owners of a rea-
sonable investment-backed expectation, it violates the takings
clause of the U.S. Constitution.
III. THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
The constitutionality of the Broad Form Deed Amendment
can also be evaluated in light of the contract clause of the United
States Constitution8 0 which provides that "No State shall ...
pass any ... Law impairing the Obligations of Contracts
... !P,181 This provision was enacted against a background of
economic depression and was intended to deal with a specific
problem that had arisen under the Articles of Confederation. In
response to the economic difficulties of their debtor citizens,
many states had enacted legislation relieving debtors of their
obligations by readjusting the contractual obligations between
debtors and creditors. This legislative tinkering with established
contractual rights created its own economic problems by dis-
couraging extensions of credit and hampering trade. 1 2 The con-
tract clause was an attempt to stabilize contractual relationships
,7 Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 308-9. Augering is another contemporary mining method
which was not in common use at the time most broad form deeds were executed. Id. at
n. 21. The Amendment probably also prohibits longwall mining and continuous seam
mining because they are contemporary mining methods not commonly used in the early
1900s.
"I Id. at 308.
So U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10.
1 Id.
,8 Home Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1934).
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by preventing legislative interference with them. This situation
was described by Chief Justice Marshall in his dissent in Ogden
v. Sanders:
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and
creditor, of interfering with contracts, a power which comes
home to every man, touches the interest of all ... and destroys
all confidence between man and man. This mischief had be-
come so great, so alarming, as not only to impair commercial
intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the
morals of the people, and destroy the sanctity of private fate.
To guard against the continuance of the evil, was an object of
deep interest with all the truly wise, as well as the virtuous, of
this great community, and was one of the important benefits
expected from a reform of the government." 3
After its inclusion in the Constitution, the reach of the
contract clause was soon expanded beyond debtor/creditor re-
lations. In Fletcher v. Peck,14 the first Supreme Court case to
interpret the contract clause, the issue was the state's ability to
rescind land grants which had been obtained by bribery in the
Great Yazoo Land Scandal. Again, in Dartmouth College v.
Woodward,'85 the issue was whether the state had the power to
alter the corporate charter granted to Dartmouth College. The
Court found the charter was a contract and the state was pro-
hibited by the contract clause from passing legislation to amend
it.
In the early years of this country the contract clause was the
most widely used means of protecting individual property rights
against state regulation.1
8 6
Before 1889 the contract clause had been considered by the
court in almost 40% of all cases involving the validity of state
legislation. So successfully was its protection invoked that it
was the constitutional justification for 75 decisions in which
state laws were held unconstitutional, almost half of all of
those in which the legislation was declared invalid by the
Supreme Court.
t 7
" 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212, 354-55 (Marshal C.J., dissenting)(1819).
,14 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
,81 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
" Comment, The Contract Clause: A Constitutional Basis For Invalidating State
Legislation, 12 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 927 (1979).
187 B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 95 (1938).
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In the late 19th Century, the influence of the contract clause
began to wane with the rise of due process analysis under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Consti-
tution.' 8 During the Depression of the 1930s, the states again
attempted to enact legislation readjusting debtor/creditor rela-
tions. Part of the analysis of the constitutionality of those sta-
tutes involved the contract clause. 18 9
After that brief resurgence, the contract clause again lapsed
into dormancy until 1977 and 1978 when the United States
Supreme Court resurrected it to strike two statutes in United
States Trust Company v. New Jersey'9° and Allied Structural
Steel v. Spannaus. 9 For its contract clause analysis in these two
cases, the Court turned to a test set out in an earlier case, Home
Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell.'92 Blaisdell has be-
come the benchmark case for modern contract clause interpre-
tation since, as Justice Blackman described it in United States
Trust Company, it is "regarded as the leading case in the modern
era of contract clause interpretation.'
' 93
A. Blaisdell
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell'94 involved
a challenge under the contract clause to the Minnesota Mortgage
Moratorium Law. In 1933, the Minnesota legislature declared a
state of emergency because of the economic depression that
gripped the United States at that time. As a response to that
state of emergency, the Minnesota legislature provided a judicial
means for postponing mortgage foreclosures and sales and for
lengthening the mortgagor's redemption period after a foreclo-
sure.
The purpose of the legislation was to prevent massive fore-
closures and the dislocation of large portions of the population
into homelessness as well as large deficiency judgments against
mortgagors. 95 The Act was by its terms temporary since it was
"I United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 1, 14-15.
19 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398.
,1 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 1.
,9, Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
t92 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398.
191 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 15.
1 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398.
191 Id. at 421, n. 3.
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to remain in effect only until the emergency abated or for two
years, whichever came first. Under this legislation, mortgagors
did not receive complete relief from their contractual obligations.
The mortgage agreements remained in effect, but the foreclo-
sures were postponed, and during the forbearance period, mort-
gagors were required to make rental payments to the mortgage
holders. 
196
In support of its legislation, Minnesota argued the act was
a response to an emergency situation and was a valid exercise
of the state's police power to protect the public welfare. The
Blaisdell Court was then faced with the task of reconciling the
state's right to exercise its police power with the contract clause's
absolute command that the state enact no laws impairing the
obligations of contracts. The Court concluded that despite its
absolute terminology, the contract clause does not absolutely
prohibit impairment of contracts by the state's police power.
The Court further determined that the state's police power and
the mandate of the contract clause must be reconciled and bal-
anced. "To ascertain the scope of the constitutional prohibition
[of the contract clause] we examined the course of judicial
decisions in its application. These put it beyond question that
the prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with
literal exactness like a mathematical formula." 1 97
Rather, the contract clause is subject to qualification by the
state's police power to protect public welfare, just as the state's
police power is restricted by the contract clause. "The reserved
powers [of the state] cannot be construed so as to destroy the
limitation [of the contract clause], nor is the limitation to be
construed to destroy the reserved power [to the state] and its
essential aspects. They must be construed in harmony with each
other."' 98 Applying this notion of harmonization to the Minne-
sota Mortgage Moratorium Law, the Court found it was a valid
exercise of the state's police power and did not offend the
contract clause.199
The Court identified five factors it considered in upholding
the statute. First, the statute was specifically enacted to address
an emergency that had been declared by the state. The Court
,9 Id. at 425.
Id. at 428.
I Id. at 439.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 447.
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confirmed that emergency by judicial notice.2 0° Second, the leg-
islation addressed a general social problem and the statute "was
not for the mere advantage of particular individuals. "201 The
Court's third consideration was the means by which the statute
addressed the general social problem. It determined that the
means adopted by the legislature were well suited to address the
situation. 
202
Fourth, the Court noted that the conditions imposed by the
legislation were not unreasonable in that they did not destroy
the obligations of contract. They merely postponed the enforce-
ment of those obligations for a temporary period.203 In addition,
the statute provided for compensation to the mortgagee during
the time that the mortgagor's obligations were suspended. 20 4 In
this part of its analysis, the Court did not give full deference to
the determinations of the state legislature. Rather, it analyzed
the reasonableness of the purpose of the legislation and the
means chosen by the legislature to meet that purpose. The fifth
factor that the Court noted in upholding the Minnesota Mora-
torium Act was that the legislation was temporary.205
With these five factors, the Blaisdell Court created a stringent
test for evaluating whether a state's exercise of its police power
offends the contract clause. However, in the years following
Blaisdell, the stringency of this test diminished, and the contract
clause fell again into disuse until it was resurrected in 1977 in
United States Trust Company v. New Jersey.
206
B. United States Trust and Allied
In its decision in United States Trust Company, the Supreme
Court used the contract clause to strike a statute for the first
time in nearly 36 years. At issue in this case was the repeal by
the legislatures of New York and New Jersey of legislative cov-
enants that served as security for bonds issued by the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey.
The Port Authority was organized in 1921 to coordinate
transportation around and through the Port of New York. In
200 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444.
101 Id. at 445.
202 Id.
203 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 445-46.
200 Id.
10, Id. at 447.
2 United States Trust Co.. 431 U.S. 1.
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1960, the Port Authority proposed to acquire the Hudson and
Manhattan Railroad, a bankrupt commuter system that served
an area around the port. This expansion plan required using
Port Authority income in ways that conflicted with the covenants
previously given by the legislatures of New York and New Jersey
as security for bonds issued by the Port Authority. When the
legislatures proposed to repeal those covenants, that repeal was
attacked as an impairment of the contract between the states
and the bond holders. 207 Both states repealed their covenants,
but suit was brought only against New Jersey.
The Court first addressed whether there was an impairment
of the contract at all. The states contended that although the
covenants were a part of the bondholders' contracts, the repeal
of the covenant had an insignificant effect on the market value
of the bonds. The Court rejected this attempt to focus on the
extent of the impairment as a prerequisite to implication of the
contract clause. 208 The Court found that since there was an
impairment of the contract, the issue was whether that impair-
ment which was prohibited by the contract clause could be
reconciled with the state's exercise of its police powers. 20 9 "Thus,
a finding that there has been a technical impairment is merely a
preliminary step in resolving the more difficult question whether
that impairment is permitted under the Constitution.
' 210
The Court also noted that simply having a legitimate public
purpose for the legislation is not of itself sufficient to protect
the legislation from a contract clause challenge. "Yet the con-
tract clause limits otherwise legitimate exercises of the state
legislative authority, and the existence of an important public
interest is not always sufficient to overcome that limitation. 2 '
Balancing the dictates of the contract clause and the state's
police powers, the United States Trust Court looked to the
stringent test set out in Blaisdell. The Court noted, however,
that the stringency of the Blaisdell test should be tempered by
the policy of legislative deference which was articulated in East
New York Savings Bank v. Hahn.21 2 "As is customary in review-
207 Id. at 4-14.




212 East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
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ing economic and social regulations, however, courts properly
defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonable-
ness of a particular measure.'"'23 The Court went on to say that
when a state enacts legislation impairing its own contracts, no
legislative deference is appropriate. The Court must determine
for itself the reasonableness and necessity of the legislation. For
a state's impairment of its own obligations, the Court adopted
a stricter scrutiny.
214
The Court acknowledged that encouraging mass transporta-
tion and energy conservation were legitimate state goals.
215 It
then examined whether the means used by the legislature of New
Jersey in repealing its covenants were "both reasonable and
necessary ' 21 6 using a very strict test of necessity. First it consid-
ered whether a mere modification of the covenant-something
less drastic than total repeal-would have served the state's
purpose. The Court was not willing to leave the choice of the
means of obtaining its legitimate goal solely to the legislature.
The Court found the state had failed "to demonstrate that repeal
of the 1962 covenant was similarly necessary.
217
The next year the Court used a similar analysis in Allied
Structural Steel v. Spannaus2t to invalidate a Minnesota statute
dealing with private contracts. At issue in Allied was the Min-
nesota Private Pension Benefits Act. This statute affected only
private employers with 100 or more employees (with at least one
in Minnesota) that also provided pension benefits under a plan
that qualified for tax treatment under Section 401 of the Internal
Revenue Code. 21 9 If such an employer terminated the pension
benefit plan or left the State of Minnesota, it would be subject
to a "pension funding charge.' '220
The statute required such an employer to pay into its pension
benefit plan the difference between the amount already in the
fund and the amount that would be necessary to cover full
pensions for all employees who had worked at least ten years
for the company. If the employer left the state, the statute, in
23 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22, 23.
1,4 Id. at 23, 24.
"I Id. at 28.
26 Id. at 29.
"I Id. at 31.
21S Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
119 Id. at 238.
220 Id.
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effect, provided the employees with ten year cliff vesting regard-
less of the terms of the particular benefit plan.
22'
Allied closed its Minnesota office in 1974 and was assessed
a funding charge of approximately $185,000.00.222 Allied chal-
lenged the statute in Federal District Court 23 where it was up-
held.
The Supreme Court had no difficulty in making the initial
determination that the statute substantially altered the private
contractual obligations between Allied and its employees. As in
United States Trust, the Court then proceeded to analyze the
balancing between the state's asserted interest in what it claimed
to be an exercise of its police power and the contract clause.
224
The Court noted that unlike the legislation at issue in United
States Trust, the Minnesota Private Pension Benefits Protection
Act affected only private contracts and not contracts of the state
itself.2215 However, the Court did not automatically adopt a policy
of deference towards the Minnesota legislature's determinations
of the purpose and reasonableness of the Act. Instead, the Court
analyzed the severity of the legislation's impairment of private
contracts. The Court stated that if the alteration of the contract
was minimal and placed little burden on the individual, the
analysis might terminate with no further investigation of the
legislation's purpose and means. "Minimal alteration of con-
tractual obligations may end the inquiry at its first stage. Severe
impairment, on the other hand, will push the inquiry to a careful
examination of the nature and purpose of the state legisla-
tion. ' 226 Thus, the Allied Court determined that when the im-
pairment of a contract between individuals is severe, it will
receive the same close scrutiny given to a state's impairment of
its own obligations.
227
To determine whether the legislation's impairment of a pri-
vate contract was severe, the Court looked primarily at the
degree to which the impairment undermined reasonable reliance
on the contract. The Court used reliance as the measure since it
saw the protection of the stability of contractual relations (and
223 Id. at 238-40.
2 Id. at 239.
223 Fleck v. Spannaus, 421 F.Supp. 20 (D. Minn. 1976).
22, Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 240, 241.
22 Id. at 243, 244.




the consequent reliance on those contracts) as one of the primary
purposes of the contract clause.
2
1
The severity of an impairment of contractual obligations can
be measured by the factors that reflect the high value the
Framers placed on the protection of private contracts. Con-
tracts enable individuals to order their personal and business
affairs according to their particular needs and interests. Once
arranged, those rights and obligations are binding under the
law, and the parties are entitled to rely on them.
2 9
The Court found Allied significantly relied on its contract
with its employees regarding pension benefits. Allied based its
contributions to the pension fund on actuarial calculations di-
rectly related to the vesting requirements set out in the plan. By
establishing new vesting requirements and requiring different
pension contributions from Allied, the legislation undermined
the corporation's reasonable reliance on its contracts with its
employees .230
Having established that the legislation significantly impaired
private contracts, the Court then examined the necessity and
reasonableness of the legislation using the nondeferential test set
out in Blaisdell. The Court incorporated the five factors in
Blaisdell into its analysis in their original form.
In upholding the state mortgage moratorium law, the [Blais-
dell] court found five factors significant. First, the state leg-
islature had declared in the Act itself that an emergency need
for the protection of homeowners existed. [Blaisdell] at 444.
Second, the state law was enacted to protect the basic societal
interest, not a favored group. Id. at 445. Third, the relief was
appropriately tailored to the emergency that it was designed to
meet. Id. Fourth, the imposed conditions were reasonable. Id.
at 445-447. And finally, the legislation was limited to the
duration of the emergency. Id. at 447.23
1
In applying these factors to the Minnesota legislation, the Court
found it did not address an important general social problem.
Yet there is no showing in the record before us that this severe
disruption of contractual expectations was necessary to meet
228 Id.
129 Id. at 245.
230 Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 245-47.
21, Id. at 242.
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an important general social problem. The presumption favor-
ing "legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness
of a particular measure," United States Trust Company, 431
U.S. at 23, simply cannot stand in this case.
32
The Court also found that the legislation was not a response
to an emergency or a pressing social problem.233 Although the
Court pointed out that "an emergency of great magnitude" is
not a prerequisite, the legislation must address a "broad societal
interest.'
234
Finally, the Court considered whether the subject addressed
by the legislature had been previously regulated. 25 The Court
reasoned that if one enters into a contract in an area that is
highly regulated, it is more reasonable to expect that the con-
tractual relations might be changed by legislation. This would
reduce legitimate reliance on the contractual terms.236
The Court summarized its finding that the Minnesota Private
Pensions Benefits Protection Act violated the contract clause by
comparing that act to the Mortgage Moratorium Act upheld in
Blaisdell. The Court struck the Private Pension Benefits Protec-
tion Act because: [1] it was not enacted to deal with a "broad,
generalized, economic or social problem"; [21 "[iut did not op-
erate in an area already subject to state regulation"; and [3]
"[ilt did not effect simply a temporary alteration of the con-
tractual relationships of those within its coverage, but worked a
severe, permanent and immediate change in those relationships
irrevocably and retroactively.
' 237
C. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light
Co.
2 3 8
In this case, the United States Supreme Court evaluated the
constitutionality of the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act
against a challenge that it violated the contract clause. The
Kansas Act imposed price controls on intrastate gas sold under
contracts entered into prior to April 20, 1977. Kansas enacted
232 Id. at 247.
2" Id. at 249.
Id. at 249, n. 24.
233 Id. at 250.
236 See Veix v. Smith Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 310 U.S. 32 (1939).
137 Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 250.
118 Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
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this statute pursuant to the federal Natural Gas Policy Act of
1987 which established price controls for numerous categories
of gas with the goal of eventually deregulating the price of
natural gas.239 The Kansas Act prevented intrastate gas prices
from rising pursuant- to escalation provisions in the affected
contracts. Those contract provisions increased gas prices in ac-
cordance with governmental ceiling prices or prices paid under
certain other contracts.2' °
In 1975, the Kansas Power & Light Co. (KPL) had entered
into two natural gas supply contracts for intrastate gas with
Quinton Oil Company. Quinton Oil Company was the predeces-
sor in interest of Energy Reserves Group, Inc. (ERG). Both of
these contracts contained two kinds of indefinite price escalators.
One escalator was a governmental price provision which allowed
the price under the contract to escalate to the maximum price
permitted by a governmental authority. The second indefinite
escalation provision allowed ERG, the seller, to have the contract
price redetermined at given intervals. The redetermined contract
price was to be based on the average of the prices paid under
three other contracts chosen by the parties.
24
1
The Energy Reserves Group attempted to escalate the price
of intrastate gas under these contracts to the highest price set
by the federal government for interstate gas under the National
Gas Policy Act. KPL responded that the Kansas Act prevented
ERG from invoking the governmental price escalator to raise
the price of intrastate gas under the contracts. When that issue
was litigated, the trial court and the Supreme Court of Kansas
affirmed that interpretation of the Kansas Act and determined
the Act did not violate the contract clause. The state courts
found Kansas had a "legitimate interest in addressing and con-
trolling the serious economic dislocations that the sudden in-
crease in gas prices would cause .... ",242 On its review of the
legislation, the United States Supreme Court agreed.
The Court began with the proposition that, although the
contract clause is facially absolute, it must be balanced with the
state's inherent police power to protect the "vital interest" of
its citizens. 243 The Court looked to its recent decisions in United
239 Id. at 405-6.
2I0 Id. at 407.
I' d. at 403-4.
22 Id. at 409.
241 Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 410.
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States Trust and Allied and determined that "the threshold
inquiry is 'whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a
substantial impairment of a contractual relationship'. Allied
Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 244. ' '24 The Court also adopted
the position from Allied that "[tihe severity of the impairment
is said to increase the level of scrutiny to which the legislation
will be subjected. ' 245 According to the Court, one measure of
the extent of impairment is the degree to which the area covered
by the legislation in issue has been previously regulated. "In
determining the extent of the impairment, we are to consider
whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been
regulated in the past.
' 246
If it is determined as a threshold issue that the legislation
creates a substantial impairment of the contract, then the inquiry
would shift to the state's interests in promulgating the legislation.
"If the state regulation constitutes a substantial impairment, the
State, in justification, must have a significant and legitimate
public purpose behind the regulation, United States Trust Com-
pany, 431 U.S., at 22, such as the remedying of a broad and
general social or economic problem. ' 247 The Court also noted
that requiring the state to have a general public purpose insures
that the legislation is truly an exercise of the state's police power
and not legislation enacted for the benefit of certain individuals
or special interests.248
If the state can demonstrate that the legislation is an exercise
of its police power by showing that it has a legitimate public
purpose, then the Court must determine whether the conditions
imposed by the legislation are appropriate to its purpose. This
final analysis is limited, however, to legislation in which a state
impairs the obligations of its own contracts or to legislation
which imposes a severe impairment of contractual relations.
249
In making the threshold determination whether the Kansas
Act significantly impaired ERG's contractual rights, the Court
first noted that the natural gas industry is heavily regulated.
20
The Court reviewed the long history of federal regulation of
I" Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411.
245 Id.
U6 Id.
141 Id. at 411-12.
z, Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412.
249 Id. at 412-13.
250 Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 413.
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interstate gas prices and the effect of that regulation on intrastate
prices. Indeed, the very existence of a governmental escalator
clause and contractual provisions making the agreement subject
to present and future state and federal law was an acknowl-
edgement by the parties of the extensive regulation of the natural
gas industry.25' The Court found that price regulations such as
those imposed by the Kansas Act were foreseeable by the parties
as the type of legislation that could alter their contractual rela-
tions. "In short, ERG's reasonable expectations have not been
impaired by the Kansas Act.
'252
Since the Court found no substantial impairment, the anal-
ysis could have ended there. However, the Court went on to
review the interest of the state in enacting the gas price regula-
tions. The Court found that it was a valid exercise of the state's
police power as an attempt to protect its citizen consumers from
the effect of deregulation of natural gas prices and consequent
escalation of those prices. 25 1 In reviewing the means that Kansas
chose to implement its legitimate purpose, the Court noted that
the statute was temporary as it was designed to follow the federal
deregulation of natural gas prices.
25 4
In analyzing the Kansas Act, the Court seems to have em-
phasized the expectations of the parties in making the contract
and their knowledge and expectation that the legislation could
alter their agreement. Having such knowledge and contracting
in an area that was heavily regulated, the Court determined that
the parties must have expected that their contractual obligations
could be altered. Thus it found that the Kansas Act did not
violate their reasonable expectations in their contractual obliga-
tions.
D. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, Commissioner of Revenue of
Alabama255
The next year, the Court addressed an analogous situation
involving an Alabama act which amended that state's longstand-
ing severance tax on oil and gas. The existing statute provided
that the severance tax was levied on the ownership interest in
' Id. at 415-16.
Id. at 416.
'" Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 416-17.
2 Id. at 418.
2 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
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the oil and gas, but would be paid by the entity in charge of
the production operations. In 1979, the Alabama legislature
amended that Act to increase the amount of the severance tax.
The amendment also provided that royalty owners were exempt
from the payment of any of the increased tax. To insure that
the producers of the oil and gas did not simply pass the increase
in the severance tax on to the consumers, the statute prohibited
the pass-through of the increased tax.
256
The legislation was challenged by producers who had pro-
duction contracts requiring the owners of royalty interests in oil
and gas to bear part of the severance taxes. The producers also
had sale contracts which required the purchasers of the oil and
gas to reimburse the producers for all severance taxes. One basis
for the challenge was that it impaired the producers' contractual
rights under these two groups of contracts. 257 The trial court
found the Alabama statute unconstitutional and struck it in its
entirety. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed
and found the entire statute valid.
258
Once this Act was before the United States Supreme Court,
the first issue addressed was the constitutionality of the statute's
exemption of royalty owners from paying the increased severance
tax. The Court found this to be a non-issue under the contract
clause since it determined the statute did not nullify any con-
tractual rights. It interpreted the statute merely to prohibit the
state from levying against the royalty owners for the increased
taxes. The Court found that the statute did not prevent the
royalty owners from voluntarily agreeing to share in that in-
crease. Thus, no contractual rights or obligations were impaired
by that aspect of the statute.
259
The Court found that the pass-through prohibition, on the
other hand, did affect the producers' contractual rights. That
provision nullified the contractual terms requiring the purchasers
of the oil and gas to reimburse the producers for all severance
taxes. Such a contractual provision would in effect pass sever-
ance taxes through to the purchaser, so it was prohibited by the
statute. 26
0
216 Id. at 178-79.
211 Id. at 180.
258 Id.
Id. at 187-89.
0 Id. at 189.
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In its analysis of whether this impairment of a contractual
right violated the contract clause, the Court took a slightly
different approach from its previous contract clause cases. The
Court began with the proposition that it must balance the state's
legitimate exercise of its police power against the mandate of
the contract clause. It reviewed the many cases in which it had
upheld state legislation enacted for the public good, even though
the legislation tangentially or indirectly affected contract rights.
These are statutes such as those prohibiting lotteries2 6' and the
sale of beer,2 62 and workers' compensation statutes which applied
to pre-existing employment contracts.
263
In reviewing those cases, the Court noted that none of the
statutes involved had the acknowledged purpose of affecting or
impairing contracts. The impairment of the contracts was noth-
ing more than an indirect consequence of the state's determi-
nation that beer and lotteries were injurious to the public welfare
and that workers' compensation statutes were beneficial to its
citizens .264
Following this line of reasoning, the Exxon Court pointed
out that the pass-through prohibition contained in the Alabama
statute was not directed at any particular contracts and was not
designed to directly affect any specific contractual obligations.
However the statute was designed to protect consumers from
bearing the burden of the increase in the severance tax, which
the Court had found to be a legitimate public interest.
2 65
Like the laws upheld in these cases [prohibiting lotteries, etc.],
the pass-through prohibition did not prescribe a rule limited
in effect to contractual obligations or remedies, but instead
imposed a generally applicable rule of conduct designed to
advance "a broad societal interest," Allied Structural Steel
Co., supra at 249: protecting consumers from excessive prices.
The prohibition applied to all oil and gas producers, regardless
of whether they happened to be parties to sale contracts that
contained a provision permitting them to pass tax increases
through to their purchasers. The effect of the pass through
prohibition on existing contracts that did contain such a pro-
16, Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
z Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878).
: New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
2 Exxon, 462 U.S. at 191.
I /d. at 191-92.
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vision was incidental to its main effect of shielding consumers
from the burden of the tax increase.
266
The Court distinguished the Alabama statute from the statutes
which were struck in United States Trust Co. and Allied. It
found that the statutes in the latter cases were designed to
directly affect contractual rights as opposed to merely having an
indirect effect on them.
267
The Court also acknowledged Alabama's power to enact the
statute in issue. It noted that the Court had on many occasions
approved rate-setting legislation, even though that legislation
replaced contractually agreed upon rates.
268
With the Exxon case, the Court injected a new element into
its contract clause analysis: whether the legislation's purpose was
to directly affect contractual relationships and obligations. If the
effect on contracts is indirect or secondary and the legislation is
enacted for different legitimate police power purposes, the leg-
islation may be sustained. However, the Court did not explain
how this new element fits into the Blaisdell test nor how it is to
be weighted.
E. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis
269
The Court's most recent contract clause analysis was in 1987
with its decision in Keystone, 270 in which the Pennsylvania Bi-
tuminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act was chal-
lenged. That Act required coal operators to leave 500 of the
coal beneath certain structures, water courses, and cemeteries to
provide surface support and to prevent subsidence. 27' The Act
also authorized the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Resources to take certain punitive measures against coal opera-
tors who had failed to repair subsidence damage, failed to satisfy
any claims arising from subsidence, or had not deposited security
for payment of that damage within six months of the claim.
272
The Keystone Bituminous Coal Association challenged the
Act in part on the basis that Section 6, which addressed the
266 Id.
167 Id. at 192.
268 Id. at 192-94.
I" Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470.
Id.




sanctions for failure to repair subsidence damage, violated the
contract clause. The members of the Association were parties to
numerous contracts in which the owners of the surface had
waived any damage to the surface arising out of mining. The
Association claimed that Section 6 of the Act impaired their
rights under those contracts.2
That challenge was brought in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The District
Court rejected the Association's contract clause challenge, found
that the statute had a public purpose, and gave great deference
to the state legislature's determination of the necessity and rea-
sonableness of the legislation since it only affected private con-
tracts. 2 4 The Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the United States
Supreme Court.
In responding to the challenges to the Act, the Supreme
Court first addressed the Association's claim that the Act con-
stituted a taking of property in violation of the takings clause.
2
11
After a lengthy and painstaking analysis, the Court determined
that the Act did not constitute an impermissible taking and
turned its attention to the contract clause challenge. That anal-
ysis was much more cursory. In its takings analysis, the Court
had already determined that the Act was a valid exercise of the
state's police power with the legitimate general public purpose
of protecting the citizens of Pennsylvania from subsidence caused
by underground mining.
276
In its contract clause analysis, the Court acknowledged that
the Act created a substantial impairment of a contractual rela-
tionship and then turned to the justifications for the impair-
ment. 277 The Court attempted neither to analyze the extent of
the impairment nor to determine whether a stricter level of
scrutiny (as where a state impairs its own contract) was appro-
priate. The Court acknowledged that having found an impair-
ment, even though the purpose of the legislation was proper, it
needed to look at the reasonableness of the conditions imposed
upon contractual relationships in serving that purpose. 27 How-
"' Id. at 478-80.
174 Id. at 478-81.
271 See supra text accompanying notes 55-171.
... Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 485-93.
177 Id. at 504.
278 Id. at 505.
1989-90]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
ever, the Court did not perform its own analysis of those con-
ditions, but simply deferred to the determinations of the
Pennsylvania legislature that the conditions were appropriate.
279
The opinion in Keystone leaves no doubt that the Court's
contract clause analysis was far secondary to its analysis of the
constitutionality of the Act under the takings clause. Whether
this case heralds a new decline for the contract clause or is
simply an aberration remains to be seen. It may simply indicate
the takings test is so much more stringent, that only when the
Act has survived a takings clause challenge is it subject to the
secondary contract clause analysis. Keystone in no way officially
reversed or impugned any of the elements of analysis that the
Court has developed in its modern contract clause jurisprudence.
Until the Court clarifies its contract clause analysis, any evalu-
ation of the constitutionality of legislation under the contract
clause must consider all of the various tests the Court has
articulated in recent years.
F. Kentucky's Broad Form Deed Amendment
To decide whether Kentucky's Broad Form Deed Amend-
ment violates the contract clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, one must first determine whether it impairs or alters the
rights and obligations of the parties to broad form deeds. One
must also examine whether it impairs the contracts of those who
have made subsequent contractual relationships such as deeds or
leases based on those original broad form deeds. Like the statute
at issue in United States Trust,2s0 there is little question that the
Amendment impairs these contracts. The operative section of
the Amendment expressly affects the rights and obligations of
the parties to broad form deeds.
One characteristic of broad form deeds is a provision stating
that the owner of the minerals has the right to use the surface
of the mineral property for all purposes "necessary or conven-
ient" to mining, transporting or preparing the coal removed
from that property. 281 One would assume from the plain lan-
guage of the deed that the right to use the surface for all
necessary and convenient purposes related to mining would per-
279 Id.
8 United States Trust v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1.
Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 298.
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mit the mineral owner to use methods of mining developed after
the date of the deed. The Kentucky Supreme Court reached this
conclusion in Buchanan v. Watson2 82 and recently reaffirmed it
in Akers v. Baldwin.2 83 By its very terms, the Broad Form Deed
Amendment would impair that right to use the surface for all
necessary and convenient purposes by prohibiting the use of
modern mining methods unless the mineral owner obtained the
consent of the owner of the surface. Like the pension statute at
issue in United States Trust, the Amendment directly and pur-
posefully readjusts the rights of the parties to the contract (the
broad form deed) and their successors in interest.
Once it is determined that the Amendment impairs the ob-
ligations of contracts either of the original parties to the broad
form deed or their successors in interest, the next issue is whether
the Amendment is a legitimate exercise of the state's police
power. If it is a proper exercise of the police power, then the
state's interest in protecting the public welfare must be balanced
against the prohibition of the contract clause.
To be a legitimate exercise of the state's police power, the
legislation in issue must address a broad societal problem. 2 4 One
reason for requiring that an exercise of the police power address
a broad societal problem is to insure that it is not made for the
benefit of a few individuals or a small group.
285
As discussed above, the Amendment is not a valid exercise
of the police power because it does not serve a general public
purpose. 2 6 By its terms the Amendment gives each individual
surface owner the right to waive the provisions of the Amend-
ment. A statute can hardly be said to be enacted for the public
good if individuals can short-circuit its supposedly beneficial
purposes.
The Amendment is unlike statutes previously approved by
the United States Supreme Court prohibiting lotteries or the sale
of beer or authorizing the application of workers compensation
statutes to existant contracts. 28 7 In Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton,288
the Court upheld the natural gas rate statute at issue there by
22 Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40.
736 S.W.2d at 305.
Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 247; Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411-12.
285 Energy Reserves., 459 U.S. at 412.
z See supra notes 84-146 and accompanying text.
217 See Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 400 and cases cited therein.
288 Exxon, 462 U.S. at 190-91.
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likening it to such cases involving the prohibition of lotteries
and beer sales and the implementation of workers' compensation
statutes. The Court noted that legislation in these cases was
directed at what the state determined to be a general public evil
or good which was then abolished or implemented wholesale for
the public benefit. Unlike such legislation, the Amendment makes
no general determinations. Rather, it permits individual surface
owners to determine whether or not they will permit the use of
modern coal mining methods. Any statute which permits indi-
viduals to accept or reject it can only have been for the benefit
of those few individuals who are given the choice.
Since the Amendment is not a valid exercise of the state's
police power, it need not be balanced against the contract clause.
In such a case, the contract clause would become absolute to
prohibit any impairment of contracts by the Amendment. Rather
than doing a balancing analysis, the Amendment would simply
be struck as an impermissible impairment of contracts violating
the contract clause.
If the Broad Form Deed Amendment was found to be a
proper exercise of the state's police power, it would not neces-
sarily pass constitutional muster under the contract clause. Fur-
ther analysis would be necessary to determine whether the
impairment of contracts caused by the Broad Form Deed
Amendment is severe. According to the Allied court, if the
impairment is severe, the legislation will receive the same exten-
sive, non-deferential evaluation used for a state's impairment of
its own contracts.8 9 If the impairment is not severe, the Court
will only review the state's articulated purposes for the statute.
The Court will defer to the legislature's determination that the
means they used and the conditions they imposed are reasonable
and necessary.
To determine whether the impairment of contracts wrought
by the Broad Form Deed Amendment is severe, the Allied court
test requires one to look at the parties' reliance on the terms of
the contract.2 90 Obviously, both the purchaser of the minerals
under a broad form deed and all of that purchaser's successors
in interest relied heavily on the grant of the minerals and mining
rights contained in the severance deed. Hundreds of millions of
dollars have been expended for minerals in this state on the
9 Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 245.
290 Id. at 245-46.
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assumption that the severing broad form deed granted the prop-
erty interest and the rights it purported to transfer. That reliance
on individuals' ability to order their affairs through private
contracts is what the contract clause was intended to protect.
29'
One test for whether the parties relied on the terms of the
agreement in question in ordering their affairs is whether the
subject matter of the contract was heavily regulated by the state
at the time the contract was made. The contracts affected by
the Amendment deal primarily with the severance and transfer
of (mineral) property interests. Obviously those deeds and all
the subsequent transfers of that property interest are governed
by state laws governing the transfer of real property. Property
laws are designed primarily to maintain the status quo.
29 2 If
anything, the parties to the severance deeds and their successors
relied on the state's property law to maintain their contractual
rights and interests. The normal analysis found in the contract
clause cases is reversed in this situation. Normally, when it is
determined that the area was regulated by the state, the impli-
cation is that the parties knew their contractual obligations could
be changed by statute and their reasonable expectations in the
continuance of their contract is decreased. In the area of prop-
erty law, the parties' reasonable expectations were that their
contract would remain unchanged by state law. Thus, one can
conclude that the parties to the severance deeds and their suc-
cessors placed a great deal of reliance on the terms of those
contracts and expected state law to maintain the status quo of
those contractual obligations, as opposed to changing them. This
reliance on contractual relations, and the lack of any reason for
the parties to expect that they would be changed by statute,
indicates that the obligations of contracts created by the Amend-
ment is severely impaired.
Having determined that the impairment is severe, the means
used by the Kentucky legislature and the conditions imposed by
the Broad Form Deed Amendment are subject to further scru-
tiny. 293 Under the analysis for legislation which creates a severe
impairment of a contract or legislation in which a state impairs
its own contracts, the Court gives no deference to the determi-
nations of the legislature regarding the propriety, reasonableness
19, Id. at 245.
292 Buchanan, 290 S.W.2d at 44.
293 Id.
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or necessity of the means used by the legislature in reaching its
goals and the conditions imposed by the legislation. The Court
does its own non-deferential, virtually de novo review of the
purposes, means, and conditions of the legislation. These strin-
gent tests reach all the way back to Blaisdell through the court's
analysis in Allied.
2 94
In reviewing the Blaisdell factors, one sees that Kentucky's
Amendment meets few if any of the required factors. The im-
pairments caused by the Amendment are not temporary. Rather,
they are "a severe, permanent and immediate change in those
relationships; irrevocably and retroactively." ' 95 The Amendinent
was not enacted to protect a basic societal interest. Rather it
benefits only a small group who can choose to bring themselves
within its strictures or to remove themselves from those require-
ments.
The Amendment neither proclaims nor implies the existence
of an emergency nor does it indicate that the relief it seeks to
provide is appropriately tailored to meet any such emergency.
Moreover, on analysis, the relief which the Amendment purports
to provide does not facilitate any of the purposes listed in the
Amendment itself. 296 Thus, the Amendment is not well tailored
to the purposes it was supposedly designed to meet. Finally,
upon examining whether the conditions imposed by the Amend-
ment are reasonable, the Amendment once again fails. It is
hardly reasonable to permit individuals to slow or stop the
progress of the mining industry toward more efficient and safer
methods of mining.
In the final analysis, the Amendment fails in its balancing
against the contract clause and is unconstitutional.
III. DUE PROCESS
The strongest challenges to the Broad Form Deed Amend-
ment are under the takings clause and the contract clause. In
the interest of completeness, this article will also review possible
challenges to the Amendment under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The due process
19 Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 247-51.
191 Id at 250.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 84-146.
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clauses of the fifth2 97 and fourteenth 298 amendments impose lim-
itations on the government's ability to enact retroactive
legislation299 or to adopt irrebuttable presumptions. A retroactive
law is one that attempts to change the legal effect of conduct
which occurred before the enactment of the law. 3°° The Broad
Form Deed Amendment is, by its terms, a retroactive law,
because it imposes a constitutional rule of construction on all
instruments heretofore or hereafter executed that sever the min-
eral and surface estates.
A. Retroactive Legislation
Objections to retroactive legislation predate the United States
Constitution. One commentator traced the roots of the objec-
tions to the Roman Code that required laws to be construed
prospectively.3 10 This rule of construction was later carried into
English law. When it came to the United States, the rule also
became a restraint on the enactment of retroactive legislation.
30 2
Retroactive legislation is disfavored for three primary rea-
sons. Those reasons are: (1) reliance - the need to be able to
plan one's activities knowing their legal consequences; 03 (2) sta-
bility - the need to have past transactions remain static; °4 and
(3) fairness - the danger that retroactive legislation can be easily
manipulated to harm a disfavored class of citizens since it is
known in advance who will benefit from or be injured by the
law.30 The Broad Form Deed Amendment arguably offends all
of these considerations.
... U.S. CONST. amend. V imposes due process requirements on the federal govern-
ment.
U.. S. CONST. amend. XIV imposes due process requirements on state government.
29 There are explicit guarantees against retroactive legislation. The contract clause,
U.S. CONST., art I, § 10, provides: "No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts." The contract clause does not apply to the federal govern-
ment. Neither Congress, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, nor the states, U.S. CoNsT. art.
1, § 10, cl. 1, may pass ex post facto penal laws or bills of attainder.
10 Hochman, The Supreme Court and The Constitutionality of Retroactive Legis-
lation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1960).
10, Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw. U.L.
REV. 540 (1956).
0 Id. at 541.
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As discussed earlier,3°6 Kentucky law has consistently recog-
nized that the mineral estate created by a broad form deed is
dominant to the surface estate. Similarly, Kentucky's highest
court has uniformly permitted the mineral owner under a broad
form deed to employ any mining method as long as the mining
operation is not conducted in an oppressive, arbitrary, wanton
or malicious manner. The Broad Form Deed Amendment re-
verses these long established legal principles and defeats the
mineral owner's legitimate reliance on the legal consequences of
the mineral owner's transaction with the surface owner.
The Amendment also upsets the stability of past contractual
transactions by destroying the contractual stability which existed
under the Kentucky court's clear and consistent treatment of
damage waiver provisions in broad form deeds. Before the adop-
tion of the Amendment, damage waivers prohibited claims for
surface damage regardless of whether the damage was caused by
subsidence from underground mining, placement of spoil on the
surface, surface mining or some other activity permitted under
the terms of the broad form deed. The Amendment nullifies this
mutually bargained for contract provision.
Finally, the Amendment does not impose a neutral rule of
contract interpretation. In effect, it imposes a substantive rule
of law which forbids the surface mining of coal without the
consent of the surface owner.30 7 The purposes of the Amend-
ment's supporters were transparent. The Kentucky Supreme Court
recognized those purposes when it found the Amendment was
just another effort, in a long line of tactics by opponents of
surface mining, "to change the relative legal rights and economic
bargaining positions"30 of surface and mineral owners. The
Amendment confers a right on surface owners of coal land (the
right to prohibit surface mining without their consent) by taking
away a longstanding, preexisting right of owners of mineral
estates in coal (the right to employ new mining techniques to
extract the coal). By reaching into the past to change contractual
relations, the Amendment acts retroactively to benefit and bur-
den specific, known groups of people.
' See supra text accompanying notes 11-54.
The Kentucky Supreme Court reached the same conclusion when it determined
that the statutory counterpart of the Broad Form Deed Amendment violated the state
constitution's provision on separation of powers. See Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 308-9.
Im Id. at 310.
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The retroactive effect of the Amendment standing alone,
however, is not a sufficient constitutional basis for declaring the
Amendment unconstitutional. "Retroactivity is a ground for
holding a law void only if it contravenes a specific provision of
the Constitution. ' 3 9 Thus, the question is whether the Amend-
ment's retroactivity violates the fourteenth amendment due proc-
ess clause. 10
Such a claim is a relatively weak constitutional claim. The
Supreme Court has said it will accord to retroactive laws in the
field of economic policy the same deference it accords to other
types of social and economic legislation.31" ' That is, the Court
will not pass judgment on the wisdom of such legislation. It will
merely determine whether the law bears a rational relationship
to a legitimate governmental purpose.312
However, retroactive legislation must meet a burden not
faced by legislation that has only prospective effects. Both its
retroactive effect and its prospective application must satisfy the
requirements of due process. The Court has said that "[it does
not follow ... that what Congress can legislate prospectively it
can legislate retrospectively. The retrospective aspects of legis-
lation . . . must meet the test of due process, and the justifica-
tions for the latter may not suffice for the former."3 3
The starting point in an analysis of the limitations imposed
on retroactive legislative by the due process clause is the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co.3t 4 In that case the Supreme Court upheld legislation
that provided black lung benefits to former miners and placed
,0 Hochman, supra note 300, at 694.
,1o Whether the retroactive effect of the Broad Form Deed Amendment violates the
contract clause of the United States Constitution is discussed in this article supra text
accompanying notes 180-296. The principles embodied in the due process clause are not
coextensive with the constitutional prohibitions against state impairments of pre-existing
contracts. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733
(1984). Whether the retroactivity of the Amendment violates the takings clause of the
fifth amendment is discussed in this article supra text accompanying notes 55-179.
3, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 467 U.S. at 729-30.
Id. at 729.
'" Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976).
I" d. All citations in this discussion of the due process clause as a limitation on
the state's power to enact retroactive laws are to federal decisions. These federal decisions
apply the fifth amendment dte process clause guarantees to federal government actions
with retroactive effect. This is because most retroactive state laws have been reviewed
by the courts under the contract clause. The contract clause is not applicable to the
federal government.
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some of the financial burden for those benefits on the miners'
former employers. Coal mine operators had to pay benefits to
some miners who had left their employ before the effective date
of the Act.3 15 The Court found that the retroactive aspects of
the legislation met the test of due process because imposing
retroactive liability was "justified as a rational measure to spread
the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited
from the fruits of their labor-the operators and the coal con-
sumers.1
3 16
In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,' 7
the Supreme Court again sustained general economic legislation
in the face of a due process challenge to the retroactive aspect
of the statute. Congress had enacted a liability provision which
applied to employers who withdrew from multiemployer pension
plans. Withdrawing employers had to pay an amount equal to
their proportionate share of the plan's unfunded vested benefits
prior to withdrawal. The liability provision applied to any em-
ployer who withdrew from a multiemployer pension plan within
the five months preceding the enactment of the statute as well
as to those employers who withdrew subsequent to the adoption
of the law. The Supreme Court concluded that it was rational
for Congress to retroactively apply the statute to prevent em-
ployers from taking advantage of the lengthy legislative process
by withdrawing without liability while Congress debated the
statute.
Similarly, in two cases concerning the retroactive application
of tax statutes, the Supreme Court sustained legislation that was
challenged on due process grounds. In United States v. Hemme,318
a provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 reduced post-1976
unified estate and gift tax credit by a percentage of pre-1977 gift
tax exemptions. In United States v. Darusmont119 the Court
sustained the 1976 amendments to the tax code which increased
3, How many coal operators were actually forced to pay retroactive benefits because
it was required that a claim for benefits had to be filed within three years of the
discovery of total disability from black lung was controversial. Although the Court
recognized that this would be true for most underground mine operators, nonunder-
ground operators faced potential liability for disabilities which arose before their re-
sponsibility had been enacted into law. Usery, 428 U.S. at 16, n. 14. Thus, the Court
was willing to subject a law with limited retroactive effect to due process scrutiny.
116 Id. at 18.
3 467 U.S. 717.
476 U.S. 558 (1986).
39 449 U.S. 292 (1981).
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the rate of the minimum tax and decreased the allowable ex-
emptions for the entire year in which the statute was passed even
though the statute was not enacted until June of 1976.
The United States Supreme Court has explained the results
in these cases in a variety of ways. In Turner Elkhorn,3 20 the
Court considered whether a person who could have anticipated
the potential liability attaching to her or his course of conduct
would not have engaged in that conduct to avoid the liability.
If a person would have engaged in the conduct even if she or
he were able to anticipate the imposition of liability for those
actions, retroactive application of the statute did not violate the
due process clause.
The retroactive legislation in Turner Elkhorn3 21 satisfied that
test. Even if coal mine operators had anticipated they might
incur financial liability for disability benefits payable to employ-
ees who contracted black lung, the operators would not have
ceased mining coal. However, the retroactive effect of the Broad
Form Deed Amendment cannot be overcome by that argument.
If a current owner of a mineral estate in coal could have antic-
ipated adoption of the Amendment, the owner probably would
not have bought coal which could only be extracted by later-
developed mining techniques.
The cases involving the retroactive application of tax laws
also do not sustain the Broad Form Deed Amendment from a
due process challenge. Retroactive tax laws are permitted unless,
after considering the nature of the tax and the circumstances in
which it is laid, it can be said that its retroactive application is
so "harsh and oppressive" as to transgress the Constitution.322
The taxpayer in Hemme323 actually paid a lower estate tax
under the retroactive application of the new tax law than if the
pre-1976 tax law had been left in place. This was hardly a "harsh
and oppressive" application of the law. Compared to the tax-
payer in Hemme,3 24 applying the Broad Form Deed Amendment
to the current owner of a mineral estate in coal does yield "harsh
and oppressive" results. Prior to the enactment of the Amend-
3 Usery, 428 U.S. at 17, n. 16.
321 Id.
311 Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938). The Welch test was cited with
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ment, owners of any mineral estate in Kentucky created by a
broad form deed had purchased the right to remove the coal by
later-developed mining techniques. After the passage of the
Amendment, owners of the same mineral estate in coal cannot
extract the coal by new mining methods unless they once again
purchase that right from the surface owner.
Retroactive tax statutes also were sustained because they did
not create a new tax. For example, the taxpayer in Hemme
3 25
knew that intervivos gifts had estate and gift tax consequences.
However, while the new statute changed some of those conse-
quences, it did not impose a wholly new tax.326 The Broad Form
Deed Amendment, however, completely changes and totally re-
verses Kentucky's law as to the right to employ new mining
methods to mineral estates created by broad form deeds. Thus,
the Broad Form Deed Amendment fails to provide those subject
to its provisions with constitutionally adequate notice. As the
Supreme Court has said, "[o]ne of the relevant circumstances is
whether, without notice, a statute gives a different and more
oppressive legal effect to conduct undertaken before enactment
of the statute. 3 27 The Broad Form Deed Amendment does just
that.
The retroactive application of tax statutes, the retroactive
penalty imposed for withdrawal from multiemployer pension
plans, and the retroactive liability imposed on coal operators for
black lung benefits are different from the operation of the Broad
Form Deed Amendment for another reason. In all of the cases
in which the Supreme Court sustained the retroactive effect of
the law, the retroactive reach of the statute was confined to
short and limited periods of time prior to enactment of the
legislation.
In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. ,328 the retroactive penalty
was imposed on pension fund withdrawals which occurred in
the five months preceding enactment of the statute. The change
in the minimum tax provisions in Darusmont 29 reached back
325 Id.
326 Cf. Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928)(the Supreme Court concluded
that the retroactive operation of the Revenue Act of 1924 was unconstitutional as it
applied to gifts completed before the enactment of the statute. The principle objection
to the act's retroactive effect was the lack of notice to the taxpayer because this was the
first gift tax imposed on such transfers).
"I Hemme, 476 U.S. at 569.
328 467 U.S. 717.
- 449 U.S. 292 (1981).
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only to the beginning of the calendar year in which the legislation
was adopted. These retroactive conditions were necessary be-
cause of the practicalities of producing legislation. For example,
the purpose of the withdrawal penalties in Pension Benefit33°
was to protect multiemployer funds from the economic conse-
quences of uncompensated withdrawals. A retroactive provision
would have been defeated by employers who intentionally chose
to withdraw from multiemployer pension funds while the legis-
lation was pending before Congress.
Other retroactive legislation has withstood a due process
challenge. For example, in its decision in Texaco v. Short,33" ' the
United States Supreme Court sustained the Indiana Dormant
Mineral Interests Act from a due process challenge. That Act
also reached back to affect all mineral interests whenever sev-
ered. However, that Act differs from the Broad Form Deed
Amendment, because it applies to all mineral interests, not just
coal. If unused for a period of 20 years, the title to unused
minerals reverts to the surface owner. However it also allows
mineral owner to preserve any pre-Act property rights in the
unmined minerals by registering its ownership within two years
of the effective date of the Act.
33 2
The Broad Form Deed Amendment, on the other hand, only
affects ownership of mineral estates in coal. More importantly,
the owner of the minerals can do nothing to preserve or protect
its pre-Amendment legal rights to use and enjoy its mineral estate
if that use requires employing modern mining methods. As a
result, the Amendment completely changes the legal relationship
between the parties claiming under broad form deeds without
providing a mechanism for the owner of the mineral estate to
preserve its pre-Amendment legal status quo.333
110 467 U.S. 717.
31 454 U.S. 516.
332 Id.
"I Cf. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987)(the Supreme Court invalidated a federal
statute which attempted to abolish inheritance rights as to certain interests in tribal
lands. The Court said a statute providing for the lapse, escheat or abandonment of
private property cannot impose conditions on the continued ownership of property that
are unreasonable. Id. at 729. An unreasonable condition would be one that either cost
too much to comply with or did not allow the property owner a reasonable opportunity
to perform them and thereby avoid the loss of their property).
See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (the
Supreme Court invalidated a state statute which required landlords to permit a cable
television company to install its equipment on the landlords' building for a one-time
1989-90]
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The retroactive reach of the Broad Form Deed Amendment
applies to broad form deeds executed as long ago as 80 or 90
years.334 The United States Supreme Court has said that "legis-
lation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely be-
cause it upsets otherwise settled expectations.""33 However, the
cases in which the Court has sustained the constitutionality of
retroactive legislation typically involve merely extending a duty
or liability, not completely destroying a pre-existing legal right.
336
In the few instances in which the retroactive legislation might
be characterized as destroying a pre-existing legal right, Congress
was exercising one of its expressly granted constitutional pow-
ers.337 Those cases are best understood as merely holding that
when a person acquires a legal right or interest which Congress
has the express constitutional right to regulate, the interest is
acquired subject to the possible exercise of Congress' authority
to regulate it.
If the due process clause has any meaning as a restraint on
retroactive legislation, it should prohibit the enactment of a law
which reaches back almost one hundred years to radically alter
payment of $1. The Court said that the state had no right to take private property
without paying for it and without providing the owner with an opportunity to avoid or
mitigate the consequences of the deprivation. Id. at 436-37).
1' Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 309. If the date of the first Kentucky case to expressly
recognize that the mineral estate is superior to the surface estate is used as the point for
measuring the retroactive reach of the Broad Form Deed Amendment, it reaches back
73 years to change the law of Kentucky. See Bluegrass Coal Corp. v. Combs, 182 S.W.
207. Even if the Buchanan decision is used, the retroactive reach of the Amendment is
almost 35 years. See Buchanan, 290 S.W.2d at 40.
"I Usery, 428 U.S. at 16.
36 See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948). Congress could authorize the
recovery of excessive profits on government contracts entered into prior to the statute's
enactment as long as final payment had not been made pursuant to such contracts prior
to the statute's enactment. See also Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938)(a state could
impose a retroactive tax on stock dividends) and Funkhouser v. Preston Co., 290 U.S.
163 (1933)(a state could impose a remedy requiring the payment of interest on verdict
for breach of a contract entered into before the statute was enacted).
"' See Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935)(Congress enacted
a Joint Resolution concerning the holding of or dealing in gold pursuant to its express
power to issue and regulate currency. Therefore, the resolution's provision authorizing
the payment of all debts in the then legal tender overrode private contract provisions
("gold clauses") which had required payment in gold); and Louisville & Nashville R.R.
Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (191 1)(Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce Act
pursuant to its express power to regulate interstate commerce. The act required that the
cost of all passenger transportation had to be paid in money. The provisions of the act
overrode prior contracts the railroads had entered into with their injured employees in
which the railroads had contracted to provide free transportation for those employees).
[VOL. 5:9
BROAD FoRM DEED
the respective legal rights of the parties to a private contract.
Such a pernicious type of retroactive legislation defeats the rea-
sonable reliance of purchasers of minerals as to the nature of
their interests. It destroys the stability and predictability of the
law which is a necessary prerequisite for all economic transac-
tions. It takes away the legally recognized rights of the present
owners of mineral estates in coal by creating new rights in the
present owners of the surface estate.
338
B. Irrebuttable Presumptions
An irrebuttable presumption is created when a law declares
that a certain fact is relevant to a determination, but a certain
class of litigants is denied the right to establish that fact. An
example of an irrebuttable presumption would be a state law
which provides that "no X's are Y's," and accompanies that
presumption with a rule "and only Y's may obtain a driver's
license. '3 39 In theory, a mineral owner may rebut the Amend-
ment's presumption against the permissibility of using modern
mining methods by introducing clear and convincing evidence
that the original grantor and grantee actually intended to permit
using such mining methods. However, as most broad form deeds
were executed 80 to 90 years ago before the advent of surface
mining and other modern mining methods,3 40 the presumption is
irrebuttable in fact.
The Broad Form Deed Amendment contains the presumption
that, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, the parties to a broad form deed are determined to
have intended that the coal should be mined only by the methods
of commercial coal extraction "commonly known to be in use
in Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument was
338 In his dissent in the Texaco case, Justice Brennan correctly pointed out that
"[t]he mineral interests of the appellants . . . were . . . assuredly within the scope of
the dual constitutional guarantees that there be no taking of property without just
compensation, and no deprivation of property without the due process of law." Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. at 540-541. He also COTTeCtly Tecognized that "Iijf Indiana wele
by simple fiat to 'extinguish' all pre-existing mineral interests in the State, or to transfer
those interests to itself, to surface owners, or indeed to anyone at all, that action surely
be unconstitutional and unenforceable. ... $ Id. at 542 (emphasis added).
119 Michael H. v. Gerald D., - U.S. _, 109 S.Ct 2333, 2357 (1989)(Brennan,
J., dissenting).
'o Pfeiffer, Kentucky's New Broad Form Deed Law-Is It Constitutional? 1 J. OF
MIN. L. & POL'Y. 57, 69, n. 48 (1984-85).
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executed .... ,341 Before the United States Supreme Court could
find such a presumption unconstitutional, it would have to find
that the Amendment's ostensibly rebuttable presumption is really
an irrebuttable presumption. However, not all irrebuttable pres-
umptions are constitutionally impermissible. The Court also would
have to find that the presumption resembles the irrebuttable
presumptions it has invalidated in previous decisions.
When the Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated the Broad
Form Deed Amendment's statutory counterpart,3 42 the court ex-
pressly stated that surface mining as it is practiced today was
non-existent in the early 1900s when most, if not all, broad form
deeds were executed. Surface mining was not a commercially
viable method of coal extraction in Kentucky until after World
War II. Most broad form deeds were executed in the early part
of this century.3 43 Thus, in its practical application, the Amend-
ment functions as an irrebuttable presumption.
The Amendment, like the statute before it, "converts a re-
buttable evidentiary presumption into an irrebuttable one. .. ."
Since it is factually impossible to overcome the presumption, the
United States Supreme Court could conceivably reach the same
conclusion as Kentucky's highest court, because the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that "in passing on the consti-
tutionality of a state law, its effect must be judged in the light
of its practical application .... ,,141
However, even if the United States Supreme Court were to
reach that conclusion, not all irrebuttable presumptions are con-
stitutionally infirm. The cases in which the Court has most
readily found that an irrebuttable presumption violates the due
process clause are cases in which the presumption made an
impact on a constitutionally protected interest.314 For example,
3, Ky. CONST. § 19(2).
-2 KRS §§ 381.930-.940.
Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 308-09.
3" Id. at 309.
3, North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925).
31" Justice Scalia has suggested that the Supreme Court's irrebuttable presumption
cases must be analyzed as calling into question the adequacy of the "fit" between the
classification and the policy that classification serves. Michael H. v. Gerald D., -
U.S. , 109 S.Ct. at 2340-41. See also Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging
Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, 7 IND. L. REv. 644 (1974); Nowak, Realigning the
Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and
Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L. J. 1071, 1102-06 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Pres-
umptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449 (1975); and, Note, The Irrebutt-
able Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1534 (1974).
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in Stanley v. Illinois,3 47 the Supreme Court invalidated a state
statute which created an irrebuttable presumption that all ille-
gitimate fathers were unfit to have custody of their biological
children. The presumption impinged upon the constitutionally
protected liberty interest a father has in maintaining his on-going
parental relationship with his biological children. Similarly, in
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,3 41 the impermissible,
irrebuttable presumption that no woman more than five months
pregnant was physically capable of teaching, implicated a wom-
an's constitutionally protected liberty interest in procreating.
Conversely, the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned
the use of irrebuttable presumptions when the presumption does
not impinge upon constitutionally recognized rights or interests.
For example, in Michael H. v. Gerald D. , the Supreme Court's
most recent irrebuttable presumption case, a majority of the
Court concurred in the judgment sustaining a state law which
created an irrebuttable presumption that a child born to a mar-
ried woman living with her husband is the child of the marriage.
The majority reached this conclusion despite the fact that the
statutory presumption prevented the biological father, who was
not the husband of the child's mother, from establishing his
paternity. The majority found that a biological father did not
have a liberty interest in establishing his paternity of a child
born into a functioning marital unit. Thus, the irrebuttable
presumption at issue did not impinge on a constitutionally pro-
tected interest of the biological father.
The Supreme Court reached the same result for similar rea-
sons in Weinberger v. Salfi. 0 The Court validated a Social
Security Act provision which denied a woman and her child
Social Security benefits as the widow and child, respectively, of
a deceased wage earner. The Social Security Act defined the
terms widow and child to irrebuttably exclude a widow and
stepchild who had their relationships to the deceased wage earner
for less than nine months prior to his death. The Court distin-
guished the Salfi case from cases like Stanley
35" ' and LeFleur35 2
347 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
-- 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
u9 - U.S. - , 109 S.Ct. 2333.
350 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
" 405 U.S. 645.
312 414 U.S. 632.
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because the latter two cases dealt with constitutionally protected
liberty interests while Salfi only involved "a noncontractual claim
to receive funds from the public treasury [which] enjoys no
constitutionally protected status."
33
The presumption created by the Broad Form Deed Amend-
ment does not clearly impinge upon other constitutionally cog-
nizable rights or interests. Therefore, it is unlikely that the
Amendment would be found to violate the due process clause's
restrictions on the state's ability to create irrebuttable presump-
tions .34
V. EQUAL PROTECTION
Like the due process challenge, a challenge to the Broad
Form Deed Amendment under the equal protection clause is
relatively weak and is only included here for completeness.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution355 imposes limitations of varying
degrees of severity on a state's power to classify its citizens.
A state may act to classify people upon a "suspect ' 35 6 basis
such as race or in terms of their exercise of a fundamental
right 35 7 only if the classification satisfies a strict scrutiny re-
view. This review requires that the classification serve a com-
pelling state purpose and have an extremely close relationship
to promoting that compelling state purpose. Under the rational
relationship test, classifications created by general economic
and social welfare legislation satisfy the commands of the equal
"I Salfi, 422 U.S. at 772.
14 See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985). The Supreme Court upheld a
federal statute which terminated the interest of an owner of mining claims on federal
land who had failed to comply with an annual filing requirement. The statute provided
that the failure to file annually by the date specified "shall be deemed conclusively to
constitute an abandonment of the mining claim .... " Id. at 89 (quoting 43 U.S.C. §
1744(c)). The Supreme Court said that the statute did not create an irrebuttable pre-
sumption because the statute merely established a property regulation that terminated
all mining claims for failure to meet this reasonable regulation.
." U.S. COrNST. amend. XIV.
36 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Although the Supreme
Court sustained the temporary exclusion and detention of Japanese Americans in this
case, the majority opinion announced the strict scrutiny standard of review for race,
ancestry and national origin classifications.
" United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938).
Although the Supreme Court sustained a congressional prohibition on interstate ship-
ments of "filled" milk, the majority opinion announced the strict scrutiny standard of
review for governmental restrictions on fundamental constitutional values.
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protection clause if the state has a permissible purpose and the
classification bears a rational relationship to attaining that
purpose.35 Finally, certain classifications such as those based
on gender are tested by the United States Supreme Court under
an intermediate standard of review .' 9 The state must demon-
strate that using the classification it has employed is substan-
tially related to accomplishing an important governmental
objective.
The Broad Form Deed Amendment is subject to equal
protection scrutiny because it creates a constitutional presump-
tion applicable only to one class of mineral owners.160 By its
express terms, the Amendment's presumption applies only to
owners under deeds which sever an estate in unmined coal
from the surface estate.3 61 The presumption does not apply to
deeds which sever from the surface a mineral estate in any
other unmined minerals such as limestone or gravel.3 62 Because
358 See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). The Supreme
Court sustained a city ordinance which prohibited owners of delivery trucks from
advertising on the outside of their trucks unless the advertisement was for the owner's
business. The classification scheme was found to have a conceivable relationship to the
stated purpose of reducing distractions for drivers of other vehicles and pedestrians.
119 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Supreme Court invalidated an
Oklahoma statute which permitted the sale of 3.2076 beer to women at age eighteen but
not to males until they reached the age of 21. The middle level test has also been
employed when the classification is based on alienage, see Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S.
291 (1978), oT legitimacy, see Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
1w The classes created by the Amendment can be defined in other ways. For
example, surface mining has been used as a method of commercial coal extraction in
western Kentucky prior to its large-scale use in eastern Kentucky. Thus, owners of coal
mining rights in eastern Kentucky would be disproportionately affected by the Amend-
ment merely because of the geographical location of their coal property. However, the
United States Supreme Court has held that an equal protection violation "cannot rest
solely on a statute's lack of uniform geographic impact." Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S.
314, at 332.
36, The first line of the Amendment announces what appears to be a presumption
of general applicability. It expressly states that amendment applies to "any instruments
... purporting to sever the surface and mineral estates or to grant a mineral estate or
to grant a right to extract minerals .... " Ky. CONST. § 19(2). However, the Amendment
then limits the general applicability of the presumption it creates by expressly providing
that if such an instrument fails to express in specific terms the "method of coal extraction
to be employed," absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, it "shall be
held" that the intention of the parties was that the "coal be extracted only by the
method or methods of commercial coal extraction commonly known to be in use in
Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument was executed ... ." Id.
,61 Kentucky has 95,834.73 million short-tons of coal reserves. J. COBB, R. BRANT,
J. CURRENS, A. WILLIAMSON, KENTUCKY COAL (1985). It has 841 billion cubic feet of
natural gas and 31 million barrels crude oil reserves. VIII BASIC PETROLEUM DATA BOOK
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of the Amendment, an owner of coal and coal mining rights
must overcome, by clear and convincing evidence, the pre-
sumption that the coal may not be extracted by a mining
method3 63 not in use in Kentucky at the time the deed was
executed. However, the owner of any other type of mineral
estate who wants to employ new mining methods does not have
to overcome such a presumption.
The Broad Form Deed Amendment is social or economic
legislation that does not involve a fundamental constitutional
right, suspect classification, or the characteristics of gender,
legitimacy or alienage. Therefore, the Supreme Court would
employ the rational relationship test and subject the two classes
of mineral owners created by the Amendment to equal protec-
tion scrutiny.364 Neither the reasonableness nor the wisdom of
the legislation would be reviewed by the Court. The Amend-
ment would be struck down only if the Court found that the
differing treatment of owners of coal mining rights and owners
of all other mineral rights served no legitimate governmental
interest or that the classification was so unrelated to the
achievement of a legitimate purpose that the law was irra-
tional .365
Since the rational basis test is not difficult to pass, an
equal protection challenge to the constitutionality of the Broad
Form Deed Amendment would be less likely to succeed than
the other constitutional challenges discussed in this article.
While the test employs the Court's most deferential standard
of review, the standard is "not a toothless one. ' 3 66 State action
has failed to satisfy this minimum test for constitutionality
either because the state was not pursuing a permissible purpose
n. 2. Kentucky also has 3,420 million barrels of in-place tar-sand resources. N. NOGER,
TAR-SAND EXPLORATION IN KENTUCKY (1984). In-place oil shale resources are estimated
to be capable of producing more than 20 million barrels of shale oil. J. HAVER,
KENTUCKY OI SHALE DEVELOPMENT (1982). Kentucky's sand, gravel, clay and limestone
reserves are too large to estimate. In 1988 alone, Kentucky mined 885 thousand short-
tons of clay, 6,600 thousand short-tons of sand and gravel as well as 43,800 metric tons
of crushed limestone. L. PROSSER & G. DEVER, Tr MINERAL INDUSTRY OF KENTUCKY
(1988).
363 Contemporary mining methods which were not in common use in eastern Ken-
tucky at the time most mineral estates were severed with by a broad form deed include
surface mining, longwall mining and augering. Martin, 429 S.W.2d 395.
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. at 331.
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981).
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when it created the challenged classes or because the classes it
created were not related to the achievement of a legitimate
state interest .367
The United States Supreme Court has held that a state is
not pursuing a legitimate state interest when it creates classes
out of a desire to harm an unpopular group or to give effect
to the public's dislike, fear or antipathy towards a particular
group. For example, in United States Department of Agricul-
ture v. Moreno,3 68 the Court employed the rational relationship
test to strike an amendment to the Food Stamp Act. The
amendment disqualified households of unrelated individuals
from receiving food stamps. The history of the amendment
revealed a congressional intent to prevent "hippies" and "hip-
pie communes" from participating in the food stamp pro-
grams.169 The Court said that such a congressional purpose
could not sustain the challenged classification. "[I1f the con-
stitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congres-
sional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a 'legitimate' governmental interest."
3 70
167 Quinn v. Millsap, U.S. , 109 S.Ct. 2324 (1989)(invalidated a state law which
required the appointment of only those who owned real property in the area to a
government board developing plans to reorganize local government); Williams v. Ver-
mont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985)(invalidated a state use tax on automobiles to the extent it
granted a credit to Vermont residents who bought a car in another state and paid a
sales tax in that state, but did not grant an exemption to a resident of another state
who bought a car and paid a sales tax in that state and then moved to Vermont); City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)(invalidated a city
zoning ordinance requiring only group homes for mentally retarded persons to obtain a
special use permit); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985),
reh'g denied 471 U.S. 1120 (1985)(invalidated a state law imposing higher taxes on
nonresident insurance companies than on resident insurance companies unless the state
could demonstrated on remand that the classification related to some interest other than
a desire to discriminate against nonresident businesses); Hooper v. Bernalillo County
Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985)(invalidated a state tax exemption granted to veterans who
were residents of the state before a specified date, but did not grant an exemption to
veterans who established their residency after that date); and United States Department
of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)(invalidated a section of Food Stamp Act
disqualifying households of unrelated individuals from eligibility to receive food stamps).
See Comment, Still Newer Equal Protection: Impermissible Purpose Review in the 1984
Term, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 1454 (1986); and Note, Impermissible Purposes and the Equal
Protection Clause, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1184 (1986).
M 413 U.S. 528.
3169 Id. at 534 (quoting H.R. Conf. Ref. No. 91-1793) p. 8; 116 Cong. Rec. 44439
(1970)(Sen. Holland).
170 Id. (quoting 345 F. Supp., at 314, n. 11).
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Similarly, in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,371 the
Supreme Court invalidated a city ordinance which excluded
mentally retarded people, but not other unrelated people, from
living in group homes. The exclusion reflected the public's
dislike, negative attitude and fear of mentally retarded people,
which the Supreme Court recognized as constitutionally im-
permissable. The public's antipathy towards mentally retarded
people did not provide a legitimate basis for treating a group
home for the mentally retarded differently from other group
homes.
The preamble to the Broad Form Deed Amendment recites
a number of purposes the Amendment is supposed to serve.
Nevertheless, the enumerated reasons fail to explain why min-
eral owners of coal are singled out and forced to meet a higher
evidentiary standard to prove their right to surface mine than
are other mineral owners. The singling out of coal owners
could reflect the public's lingering animosity toward coal own-
ers because of the abuses which occurred in Kentucky when
the surface mining of coal was virtually unregulated. Due to
the damage and destruction caused by unscrupulous coal mine
operators, owners of coal mining rights in Kentucky have been
the objects of public scorn and hatred. Literature,
372 film, 373
and song374 reinforce the public's belief that coal owners are
rapacious destroyers of homes and land. The proponents of
the Broad Form Deed Amendment used that theme in their
campaign slogan "Save The Homestead." The public's nega-
tive images of coal mine operators accurately portray abuses
by coal owners in the past. However, for more than a decade,
it has been illegal for coal owners to exercise their mining
rights to destroy buildings, create off-site damage, or to leave
the surface of the land scarred and unreclaimed after the coal
has been mined. 75
"1 473 U.S. 432.
372 See, e.g., D. GARDINA, STORMING HEAVEN (1987); H. CAUDILL, THEIRS BE THE
POWER (1983); AND H. Caudill, My Land Is Dying (1971).
171 See, e.g., Matewan (1987) and Bloody Harlan (1978).
374 Hear, e.g., Reel World String Band, "Cranks Creek," In Good Time (Flying
Fish 1985) and Reel World String Band, "Drag Line," They'll Never Keep Us Down
(Rounder Records 1980).
171 In 1977, Congress enacted the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
(SMCRA), Pub.L.No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988)).
SMCRA established a comprehensive regulatory scheme for surface mining and recla-
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If the Court viewed the Amendment as a codification of
the public's fear of coal mining abuses and its negative atti-
tudes toward a historically unpopular class of property owners,
the Amendment would fail the rational relationship test. The
state has no legitimate interest in penalizing a group merely
because significant public animosity exists toward that group.
The depth and breadth of public support for the
Amendment 7 6 would not make it immune from constitutional
attack. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the electorate
as a whole, whether by amendment, referendum or otherwise,
cannot immunize the state from the requirements of the equal
protection clause. Moreover, the state could not avoid the
requirements of the clause by deferring to the wishes or objec-
tions of some part of the body politic. 77
Even if the Supreme Court determined that the Amend-
ment's presumption is a product of something other than the
public's general antipathy toward the owners of coal mining
rights, the rational relationship test would not be fully satis-
fied. The Court must also evaluate the "fit" between the
classes created and the achievement of some legitimate, iden-
tifiable governmental purpose. The "fit" does not have to
meet a mathematical test for precision, but the classification
scheme must "rationally advanc[e]" a permissible govern-
mental objective.3 78 Despite the deference which the Court
mation operations of both federal and non-federal lands within the United States. If a
state desired to assume permanent and exclusive regulatory authority (primacy) over
surface mining, it had to receive approval of a proposed permanent program from the
Secretary of the Interior. To secure that approval, the state had to enact laws and
regulations embodying the environmental protection and performance standards of
SMCRA. Kentucky received approval of its permanent program on May 18, 1982. 47
Fed.Reg. 21,404 (1982). For history of Kentucky's actions to secure primacy see, Bratt,
Surface Mining in Kentucky, 71 Ky. L. J. 7, 7-9 (1982-83). By statute, Kentucky forbids
surface coal mining operations within certain distances of public roads and buildings,
occupied dwellings and cemeteries. KRS § 350.085(3) - (4). In Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), the United States Supreme Court sustained
the constitutionality of similar restrictions imposed by Pennsylvania on coal mining that
causes subsidence damage to pre-existing buildings, dwellings, and cemeteries. Kentucky's
performance standards and reclamation requirements for surface mining are codified in
KRS §§ 350.090 to 350.117.
316 The Amendment was passed in 1988 by an 83% majority. 882,960 voted yes
and 187,119 voted no. "Presidential Preference Primary" published by the Office of
Bremer Ehrler, Secretary of State - March 8, 1988.
177 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37
(1964).
"I Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 235.
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accords to a state's decision to use classes to advance its
legitimate purposes, "[tihe State's rationale [for using classes]
must be something more than the exercise of a strained imag-
ination . .. .,,79
Elsewhere in this article, the purposes of the Broad Form
Deed Amendment as found in the preamble to the Amendment
are discussed. 80 That discussion demonstrates that retroac-
tively imposing a presumption that the ownership of a mineral
estate in coal does not include the right to use later developed
mining methods to extract the coal does not facilitate the
accomplishment of any of the asserted rationales for the
Amendment. If, as that previous discussion demonstrates, the
presumption does not advance any of the articulated purposes
of the Amendment, then imposing the presumption on this
one class of mineral owners is arbitrary and irrational.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Commonwealth of Kentucky has a legitimate and im-
portant interest in regulating the mining of coal to prevent
practices which result in destroying buildings, creating off-site
damage and failing to reclaim the land after the mining has
been completed. Both the federal and state governments have
enacted extensive programs which impose environmental pro-
tection and performance standards on surface mining. If Ken-
tucky's program does not adequately address the problems
caused by surface mining, the U.S. Constitution does not
prevent the Kentucky legislature from enacting a more strin-
gent regulatory scheme.
When a severed mineral estate is not used for a long period
of time, uncertainties of title may arise. Such uncertainties in
the title to the minerals impede the productive development of
both the surface and the mineral estates. The Kentucky legis-
lature has enacted a statutory scheme which authorizes the
commercial development of the mineral interests of unknown
or missing owners. 8' If the requirements of the statute are
"I' Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 442 (Blackmun, J., joined by
Brennan, Marshall and O'Connor, JJ.).
"I See supra text accompanying notes 84-146.
3M KRS §§ 353.460-.476.
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satisfied, the court also has the power to reunite the ownership
of the mineral and surface estates in the surface owner.
382
Because of Kentucky's very real interest in eliminating stale
and abandoned mineral interests, the legislature could enact a
dormant mineral act to supplement or substitute for its present
law on severed mineral interests of unknown or missing own-
ers. A dormant mineral act would provide a mechanism for
clearing title to unused mineral interests without first requiring
the development of the minerals. Nothing in the Constitution
of the United States prevents the Commonwealth from enact-
ing such legislation. Similarly, Kentucky has a cognizable in-
terest in the improvement of land titles. That interest could be
constitutionally achieved by the development of a quiet title
statute that would permit the title to land to be determined as
against the world rather than only against named defendants.
383
The United States Constitution does, however, prevent the
Commonwealth of Kentucky from retroactively imposing a
special rule of interpretation on instruments which create a
right to mine coal. Kentucky cannot constitutionally limit con-
temporary mineral owners holding under a broad form deed
executed prior to the adoption of the Broad Form Deed
Amendment to the mining methods commonly known to be in
use at the time the instrument was executed.
The Amendment violates the fifth amendment's prohibition
against the taking of private property for public use without
compensation. The pre-Amendment right of a Kentucky min-
eral owner under a broad form deed to mine coal by later
developed mining methods is a property right created by state
law and protected by the fifth amendment. The Amendment
does not further a valid public interest. Its real purpose is to
achieve the constitutionally impermissible objective of chang-
ing the economic bargaining positions of the surface and min-
eral owners by mandating the reinterpretation of contracts
entered into at the turn-of-the century.
The destruction of the mineral owner's right to employ
modern mining methods is the type of infringement on prop-
erty which is constitutionally impermissible. As to any mineral
owners who cannot overcome the Amendment's presumption,
382 KRS § 353.470.
383 KRS § 411.120-action to quiet title. This statute only permits the action to be
brought against named defendants who assert a claim to the land.
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the Amendment affects a total taking of the mineral owners'
property. It denies them the ability to mine their coal at all
by making it physically impossible or commercially impracti-
cable to remove the coal.
The Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence also recognizes
that a governmental act is constitutionally impermissible under
the fifth amendment when the act materially interferes with a
property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations.
A Kentucky mineral owner whose estate was created by a broad
form deed executed prior to the adoption of the Broad Form
Deed Amendment has a state-created, constitutionally protected
property interest in its investment-backed expectation that it can
employ modern mining methods to extract the coal.
The Broad Form Deed Amendment also offends the contract
clause of the United States Constitution. The United States Su-
preme Court, however, is unlikely to base its decision on a
contract clause analysis of the Amendment. Unlike the fifth
amendment's prohibitions against state actions which take private
property without just compensation, the contract clause has only
been used twice since the 1930s by the Supreme Court to invali-
date state acts.
As developed by numerous Supreme Court decisions, the
takings clause imposes more stringent limitations on state action
than does the contract clause. If a state action implicates both
the takings clause and the contract clause and the action offends
the takings clause it may also offend the contract clause. The
reverse is also true. A state action which passes constitutional
muster under a takings clause analysis probably cannot offend
the contract clause. Thus, the Court is unlikely to resurrect the
contract clause as its primary rationale for a decision in any case
challenging the constitutionality of the Broad Form Deed Amend-
ment.
Abstract arguments can be crafted to support a determination
that the Amendment's irrebuttable presumption and retroactive
application offend the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Similarly, the Amendment raises possible violations
of the equal protection clause guarantees. However, in practice,
both the due process and equal protection arguments are insuf-
ficient bases to support a declaration of the unconstitutionality
of the Broad Form Deed Amendment. The Supreme Court's
jurisprudence demonstrates that such claims are relatively weak
constitutional claims. The Court accords great deference to leg-
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islative enactments challenged under either provision because the
Court is loath to pass judgment on the wisdom of state legisla-
tion. Thus it is highly unlikely that the Court would use either
of these constitutional bases to strike the Broad Form Deed
Amendment.
The constitutionality of the Broad Form Deed Amendment
depends primarily on the Amendment's ability to survive first a
takings clause analysis and then a contract clause analysis. As
this article demonstrates, it is unlikely that the Amendment can
withstand such scrutiny.

